Design for a Working Memory by Oberauer, Klaus
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2009
Design for a Working Memory
Oberauer, Klaus
Abstract: Starting from the premise that working memory is a system for providing access to rep-
resentations for complex cognition, six requirements for a working memory system are delineated: (1)
maintaining structural representations by dynamic bindings, (2) manipulating structural representations,
(3) flexible reconfiguration, (4) partial decoupling from long-term memory, (5) controlled retrieval from
long-term memory, and (6) encoding of new structures into longterm memory. The chapter proposes
an architecture for a system that meets these requirements. The working memory system consists of a
declarative and a procedural part, each of which has three embedded components: the activated part
of long-term memory, a component for creating new structural representations by dynamic bindings
(the ‘‘region of direct access’’ for declarative working memory, and the ‘‘bridge’’ for procedural working
memory), and a mechanism for selecting a single element (‘‘focus of attention’’ for declarative working
memory, and ‘‘response focus’’ for procedural working memory). The architecture affords two modes of
information processing, an analytical and an associative mode. This distinction provides a theoretically
founded formulation of a dual-process theory of reasoning.
DOI: 10.1016/S0079-7421(09)51002-X
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-28472
Originally published at:
Oberauer, Klaus (2009). Design for a Working Memory. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 51:45-
100. DOI: 10.1016/S0079-7421(09)51002-X
C H A P T E R T W O
Design for a Working Memory
Klaus Oberauer
Contents
1. Six Requirements for a Working Memory System 46
2. The Architecture of Working Memory 48
2.1. Declarative Working Memory 50
2.2. Procedural Working Memory 57
3. Working Memory and Long-Term Memory 76
3.1. Activated Long-Term Memory 76
3.2. Structural Information in Long-Term Memory 77
3.3. Control of Encoding into and Retrieval from
Long-Term Memory 83
4. Analytic and Associative Information Processing 85
4.1. Shielding Central Working Memory Against
Long-Term Memory 85
4.2. Dimensionality of Representations 87
4.3. Independent Selection of Declarative and
Procedural Representations 90
5. Concluding Remarks 92
Acknowledgments 93
References 93
Abstract
Starting from the premise that working memory is a system for providing access
to representations for complex cognition, six requirements for a working
memory system are delineated: (1) maintaining structural representations by
dynamic bindings, (2) manipulating structural representations, (3) flexible
reconfiguration, (4) partial decoupling from long-term memory, (5) controlled
retrieval from long-term memory, and (6) encoding of new structures into long-
term memory. The chapter proposes an architecture for a system that meets
these requirements. The working memory system consists of a declarative and
a procedural part, each of which has three embedded components: the acti-
vated part of long-term memory, a component for creating new structural
representations by dynamic bindings (the ‘‘region of direct access’’ for declara-
tive working memory, and the ‘‘bridge’’ for procedural working memory), and a
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mechanism for selecting a single element (‘‘focus of attention’’ for declarative
working memory, and ‘‘response focus’’ for procedural working memory).
The architecture affords two modes of information processing, an analytical
and an associative mode. This distinction provides a theoretically founded
formulation of a dual-process theory of reasoning.
1. Six Requirements for a Working
Memory System
The study of working memory (WM) has its roots in the investigation
of immediate recall of short lists of items such as a telephone number or a list
of unconnected words (Blankenship, 1938; Nipher, 1878). Until today
most research on WM is devoted to what has become known as memory
span tasks. The seventies of the last century have witnessed an extension of
the scope of the concept of WM, now defined as a device for simultaneous
storage and processing (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), and with it came the
introduction of so-called complex span tasks that combine the immediate
recall of lists with a concurrent processing task such as reading (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980). The construct such developed has become a big success
not least because complex span tasks have turned out to be strong predictors
of performance in complex cognitive activities such as text comprehension
and reasoning (Daneman &Merikle, 1996; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Su¨ß,
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002), and are strongly related
even to general intelligence (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003).
As theorists have recognized for some time now (e.g., Baddeley, 1986;
Just &Carpenter, 1992),WMhas certainly not evolved to help us remember
telephone numbers (whether on their own or while reading unrelated
sentences). This insight nourishes the suspicion that the tasks commonly
used to operationalize WM are more a reflection of the historical develop-
ment of the field than of our theoretical understanding of its object. I think
this is unfortunate because much research is devoted to understanding the
particular tasks that happen to have emerged as established operationaliza-
tions of WM, asking questions such as ‘‘What happens in the reading span
task?’’ instead of, ‘‘How does working memory work?’’
In this chapter, I want to pursue a functional approach to WM. I will
start from an assumption about what WM is good for and attempt to
delineate some minimal requirements of a system that serves this function.
This approach is akin to Marr’s (1982) strategy to understand vision through
a computational analysis of what the visual system must accomplish,
although my analysis will not yet reach the degree of formal precision that
he achieved. The leading idea is that form follows function, so that an
analysis of the function a system is to accomplish provides useful constraints
for its architecture and its mechanisms.
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I assume that WM is a system devoted to providing access to representa-
tions for goal-directed processing. At least in humans this involves processes
such as language comprehension, reasoning, planning, hypothetical think-
ing, and creative problem solving. Success in all these activities, which I will
refer to as complex cognition, is highly correlated with measures of WM
capacity (for a review see Oberauer, Su¨ß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007). One
common characteristic of all varieties of complex cognition is that they
require the flexible combination of representations into new structures
(Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Oberauer et al., 2007), and the goal-
directed manipulation of these structures.
I propose that a system serving complex cognition must meet at least the
following six demands: First, it must be able to build and maintain new
structural representations. For instance, the system must represent new
propositions, new sequences of actions in a plan, or new constellations of
pieces on a chessboard. Building new structural representations requires a
mechanism for dynamic binding, that is, for binding content elements such as
words, objects, or events, to places in a cognitive coordinate system or to
variables in a schema. For instance, objects must be bound to locations in
physical space, events to locations on the temporal dimension, and words to
variables in syntactical and propositional schemata. These bindings must be
dynamic, which means that they can be set up quickly and dissolved quickly
when the structure is updated or discarded.
Second, complex cognition involves manipulating structural representa-
tions. This means that there must be a mechanism for selectively accessing
one or a few elements within a structure and submitting them to a cognitive
operation. For instance, mentally simulating a chess move involves picking
out one figure and moving it across the board, while all other figures stay in
their positions. This requirement calls for an attentional selection mechanism
for contents of WM. In addition, the system must have a mechanism for
deciding what to do with the selected element. This requirement points
to the need for a procedural system that represents condition-action rules
(e.g., procedures for deciding which moves to consider in a mental simula-
tion, given a constellation on the chessboard, and procedures for moving
the figures).
Third, WM is a general-purpose mechanism, not a module designed for
solving a particular problem. Therefore, it must be possible to flexibly
reconfigure it. This requirement points to the need for executive processes,
that is, processes that control its operations and configures its parameters
according to representations of goals. For instance, WM would operate
differently when the goal is to remember a constellation of pieces on a
chessboard than when the goal is to play a game, and it would operate
differently in speed chess than in ordinary chess.
The fourth requirement follows from the need for rapid updating of
structural representations and of the procedures acting on them:
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Representations in WM must be partially decoupled from knowledge and
episodic memories in long-term memory (LTM). A chess player mentally
simulating two or three moves must be able to distinguish the representation
of a hypothetical board constellation from the many representations of
similar constellations that he remembers from previous games. He must
also be able to distinguish the constellation that follows after an imagined
move from the constellation before that move. In general, manipulation of
structural representations means that the structure is frequently updated, and
therefore, WM must be able to avoid proactive interference from the
previously held representations on the current one. Likewise, the flexible
implementation of different goals requires frequent updating of procedural
representations, and therefore, WM must also be able to avoid proactive
interference from habits and routines.
Fifth, WM needs to be able to draw on relevant contents of LTM. This
implies that LTM representations that could be helpful for the problem at
hand can be retrieved efficiently. This need creates an obvious tension with
the requirement for decoupling WM representations from LTM. Thus, the
system must decide on when to allow LTM to influence the contents of
WM and when to block them off.
Finally, working out the solution to a problem would lose much of its
worth if the solution would be quickly forgotten once the system is engaged
with something else. Therefore, new structural representations built in WM
must be transferred into LTM. This means that there must be a mechanism
for transforming temporary, dynamic bindings into more permanent struc-
tural representations.
In this chapter, I will propose a blueprint for a system that meets these
requirements. Section 2 will sketch the architecture of WM, delineating
mechanisms for meeting the first three requirements. Section 3 will discuss
the interaction betweenWMandLTM,offering some speculations on how the
system meets the remaining three requirements. The structure of the chapter
does not follow strictly the list of the six requirements; therefore, Table 1
makes explicit which component of the WM system address which require-
ment and provides pointers to the sections explaining these components.
2. The Architecture of Working Memory
I will propose a sketch of the architecture of WM that is suited to fulfill
the functions introduced above. The core of the framework has first been
developed to accommodate empirical evidence (Cowan, 1988; Oberauer,
2002); here I will flesh it out by giving it a functional interpretation, and by
adding further assumptions and components, hoping that the elaborated
framework will prove useful as a blueprint for a system that serves complex
cognition.
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A first and fundamental design decision is to distinguish between declar-
ative and procedural WM. The declarative part is responsible for making
representations available for processing, whereas the procedural part is
responsible for doing the processing. In a sense, the declarative system is
the memory part, and the procedural system is the working part of working
memory. The distinction between declarative and procedural memory lies
at the heart of production system architectures such as ACT (Anderson,
1983), SOAR (Newell, 1990), and ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998),
but its implications for WM have not been spelled out (for one previous
reference to ‘‘procedural working memory’’ see Monsell, 2003). In much of
the WM literature its place has been taken by the distinction between the
central executive and the slave systems (Baddeley, 1986). In my view this is an
unfortunate conceptualization because the procedural part of the system is
no more central than the declarative part. Others have treated the terms
working memory and executive system as largely equivalent, or the former as a
subset of the latter. This is even more unfortunate because it blurs the
important distinction between the declarative and the procedural aspects.
Moreover, not every process executed can be regarded as an executive
process without draining the concept executive of all useful meaning. Here
I will make a distinction between the primary processes carrying out the
manipulations required for a task, such as mentally moving a pawn on a
chessboard, or deciding whether to press the left or the right button in a
speeded choice task, and executive processes that supervise and control the
primary processes, such as the decision to switch to another task, to update
the current WM contents by new information, or to sacrifice accuracy for
speed in a choice task.
Table 1 The Six Requirements for a Working Memory System, the Components
Assumed to Be Responsible for Them, and Where They Are Addressed in the Text.
Requirement Component Sections
1. Structural representations Region of direct access 2.1.2
Bridge 2.2
2. Manipulation Focus of attention 2.1.3
Procedural WM 2.2
3. Flexible reconfiguration Executive processes 2.2.2
4. Partial decoupling from
LTM
Distinction between activated
LTM and central components 2.1
Control of retrieval from LTM 3.3
5. Retrieval from LTM Retrieval and unpacking of chunks 3.2.2
6. Encoding of structural
information into LTM
Chunking of structural
information 3.2.1
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2.1. Declarative Working Memory
The declarative part of WM, illustrated in Figure 1, consists of three
components that constitute three embedded sets of representations, the
activated part of LTM, the region of direct access (DA region), and
the focus of attention. Functionally, the three components can be seen as
three levels of selection of representations, with each component narrowing
down the selected set more than the preceding one. In addition, the three
components have qualitatively distinct functions for the construction and
manipulation of representations, as I will elaborate below.
2.1.1. Activated Long-Term Memory
I conceptualize LTM as an associative network of representations that
activate each other automatically along their associations. The advantage
of such a system is that it is content addressable: Given any piece of
information, related information can quickly be activated, such that a
B
A
C
B
Figure 1 Architecture of declarative working memory. Small circles represent elements of
declarative representations in long-term memory. Shaded units are activated above
baseline. A subset of three elements (labeled A, B, and C) are bound to positions in
a mental space, depicted here as the rectangular frame. This subset of elements con-
stitutes the content of the region of direct access. Thin continuous arrows are associa-
tions in LTM; dotted lines are temporary bindings; double lines are relations between
elements in the region of direct access that emerge from their relative positions in the
mental space. One of the positions in mental space is selected by the focus of attention
(large thick-lined oval); the element bound to that position (B) is thereby selected for
processing.
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whole set of tightly interconnected representations can be recreated from
any subset as cue. This idea is incorporated in virtually all current theories
and models of LTM (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Gillund & Shiffrin,
1984; McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995).
An assumption that is not shared by all models is that, in LTM, there is
no strict separation between declarative and procedural knowledge. Rather,
declarative representations are associated with procedures, such that the
activation of a declarative representation such as an object, an event,
a situation, or a fact automatically activates an associated cognitive operation
(e.g., drawing an inference based on an activated stereotype), evaluation
(e.g., assessing an event as positive), or physical action (e.g., performing a
left-directed action in response to a stimulus on the left side). These
associations enable information processing that bypasses the more central
components of WM. I will return to the power and the limitations of
associative information processing in Section 4.
Representations in LTM are activated by perceptual input or through
spread of activation from other, associated representations, including repre-
sentations of goals. The currently activated subset of representations forms
the activated part of LTM. The degree of activation of a representation is an
implicit code of its expected relevance for the current situation and the
current goal (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), and its function is to make more
relevant representations more available for processing.
The increased availability of activated representations is reflected in three
consequences of activation. First, perceptual stimuli corresponding to
already activated representations in LTM are processed more efficiently
and can thereby be identified (i.e., categorized) faster and with higher
accuracy. Thus, activation contributes to priming. This gain in perceptual
fluency generates a signal of familiarity of the stimulus that can be used,
among other things, to inform recognition decisions (Whittlesea, Jacoby, &
Girard, 1990).1
Second, a representation is more likely to be retrieved, and its retrieval
takes less time, the higher its activation (for a formal development of these
assumptions see Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). Retrieval means to project a
representation into the more central component, the region of direct access,
where it can be manipulated and combined with other representations. The
third consequence is that activated declarative representations, through their
associations to procedural representations, generate tendencies for or against
associated inferences and decisions, a point to which I will return Section 4.
1 It should be added that both repetition priming and familiarity cannot be attributed only to temporary
activation of representations, because both can last for times much longer than activation can plausibly be
assumed to continue—in one instance, up to 17 years (Mitchell, 2006). I assume that activation in LTM
drives familiarity only in short-term recognition paradigms in which the recognition decision follows initial
presentation within a few seconds.
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2.1.2. The Direct-Access Region
The main function of the DA region is to render a small number of distinct
elements immediately accessible, and to integrate them into a structure.
There are two ways of building new structures, both of which involve
binding of content representations to context representations. One is to
draw on existing structure templates or schemata, such as the schema for a
proposition, which has an action at its core and relates it to arguments such
as the role of an agent (‘‘who does it?’’), an object (‘‘to who or what is
it done?’’), and other, optional roles such as instrument (‘‘with what was it
done?’’) or time (‘‘when did it happen?’’). The template arguments are
variables to which elements from large classes of concepts can be bound,
enabling us to build a virtually infinite variety of structures. For instance, we
can make sense of linguistic input such as: ‘‘The parrot beats the sheep with
a cucumber’’ by binding the concept of beating to the action variable, the
concept of parrot to the agent variable, and so on.
Another way to build structures is by binding each element to a
position in a common cognitive coordinate system. A cognitive coordi-
nate system is a mental space that can be used to literally represent physical
space, or to metaphorically represent other continuous dimensions such as
time or some quantitative variable (e.g., size, brightness, pitch, intelli-
gence, etc.). For example, I could represent my knowledge that the
population of China is larger than that of India by placing a token or
symbol for China on top of one for India in my mental space. I could then
proceed to add the knowledge that the population of India is larger than
that of Russia by placing a representation of Russia below that of India.
By being placed in a common coordinate system every element is related
to every other, and this can bring out new relations that were not
explicitly represented before, for instance, the relation between the popu-
lation sizes of China and Russia. This relation is constrained by the spatial
nature of the coordinate system that, in this case, enforces that Russia is
placed below China, so that I can infer that the population of Russia must
be smaller than that of China even if I never thought about this relation
before. This is, in a nutshell, the mechanism of deductive reasoning as
described by the theory of mental models (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird,
2005; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).
Binding elements into a multidimensional cognitive coordinate system is
also indispensable for inductive reasoning. The core operation of inductive
reasoning is to compare two entities to identify similarities and differences
between them. To go beyond global judgments of similarity, the reasoner
must approach the task in an analytic way, that is, distinguish relevant
features of the two entities and make separate comparisons with regard to
each feature. For instance, a person can judge that an orange and a tennis ball
are similar with regard to size and color, but differ with regard to edibility.
These relations can be represented simultaneously by placing the two
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objects into a three-dimensional coordinate system in which the three
dimensions are assigned to the three feature dimensions selected for com-
parison. Simultaneous representation of similarities and differences on
several feature dimensions is a key in many inductive-reasoning tasks that
feature in intelligence tests, such as the Raven matrices (Klauer, 1996).
The examples discussed above illustrate that the DA region recruits a
spatial medium of representation as a projection screen for relations on
nonspatial dimensions, by assigning to its dimensions, for instance, physical
space, time, and any feature dimension on which entities could be com-
pared. The prevalence of spatial metaphors for nonspatial relations has been
noted in studies reaching from semantics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) to
logical reasoning (DeSoto, London, & Handel, 1965; Knauff, Mulack,
Kassubek, Salih, & Greenlee, 2002) to social psychology (Bar-Anan,
Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007). I believe this prevalence reflects the
fact that space is used as a generic medium for building structural represen-
tations in the region of direct access.
To summarize, the region of direct access is a mechanism for establishing
and holding temporary bindings between contents (e.g., objects, events,
words) and contexts (i.e., argument variables in structure templates, or
positions in a generic cognitive coordinate system). By supporting arbitrary
bindings between virtually any content with any context, this system
enables the compositionality of thought that many theorists regard as a
hallmark of human cognition (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988): We can create
an unlimited number of different ideas by freely combining content
elements into new structures.
I assume that the DA region has a limited capacity that limits the
complexity of structural representations that can be assembled by temporary
bindings. The common variance reflected by measures of WM capacity
(reviewed in Oberauer, 2005c) reflects essentially this capacity limit. The
capacity limit arises from two sources, retrieval competition and representational
interference. First, with an increasing number of context-to-content bindings,
the attempt to retrieve one particular content element, cued by its context,
suffers more competition from other contents bound to related contexts.
The increasing degree of retrieval competition, however, cannot alone
explain the steep decline of performance as the load on the DA region
increases (Oberauer & Kliegl, 2001). Therefore, I assume a second form of
interference by which the content representations bound in the DA region
mutually degrade each other. Various candidate mechanisms for representa-
tional interference are currently explored through computational modeling,
among them the superposition of content–context bindings in a common
weight matrix (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002; Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2008), and the overwriting of features shared by different contents in
the DA region (Nairne, 1990; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006; Oberauer &
Lange, 2008).
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2.1.3. The Focus of Attention
Reasoning not only involves the creation of structural representations but
also their manipulation. For instance, we could use the array of three
countries described above to play through what would happen if the
population of China declined. We simply move the China token down
along the dimension that represents population size while holding the
other two elements in place—this might bring us to the conclusion that
eventually the relative order of China and India will reverse while that of
China with Russia stays the same. Selecting the target of a manipulation is
the function of the focus of attention. It picks out one element among those
currently held in the DA region and uses it as the object of a cognitive
operation, in this case the operation of simulating a population decrease. My
use of the concept of attention as applied to the contents of WM is based on
an understanding of attention in purely functional terms, referring to a
mechanism for the selection of representations for (cognitive) action
(Allport, 1987).
This discussion of the focus of attention points back to a second function
of the DA region. The contents of the DA region figure as the selection set for
the focus of attention, that is, a small set of elements that are candidates for
being brought into the focus. The focus of attention has direct access to
these elements either through their content (e.g., when instructed to ‘‘move
India up’’) or through their bindings to their places in the coordinate system
(e.g., when asked ‘‘which one is highest?’’). Access to contents through
their current contexts is what I mean by ‘‘direct access.’’ The role in a
template, or place in a coordinate system, serves as a temporary address to
which any arbitrary representation can be bound so that it can be accessed
without any knowledge about its content.
2.1.4. Evidence for the Three Components of Declarative
Working Memory
Consider the following task: You are asked to encode two short lists of digits
for a short-term memory test, presented in two rows of boxes on a com-
puter screen. After the digits are erased, one list is declared as temporarily
irrelevant for the task. Next, you must perform a series of arithmetic
operations on selected digits of the remaining list. The operations (e.g.,
‘‘þ2’’ or ‘‘4’’) are displayed in one of the boxes of the relevant list, and
you should retrieve the digit initially presented in that box, apply the
arithmetic operation to it, and type the response as quickly as possible.
This response is immediately followed by the next operation displayed in
the same or a different box of the relevant list (see Figure 2). At the end of a
series of operations, you are asked to recall both lists.
This paradigm (Oberauer, 2002) places clearly definable demands on all
three components of declarative WM, and provides evidence for their
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distinction (for an illustration of how declarative WM applies to that
paradigm, see Figure 3). Initially, all digits must be linked to their boxes
by temporary bindings. These bindings make the digits directly accessible
through their places in the cognitive coordinate system, that is, the boxes.
Binding the digits to neighboring places in this episodic context integrates
them into a structure in the DA region. The contexts of individual digits are
not perfectly distinct, and therefore, cueing one of them—by placing an
arithmetic operation in one box—also partially cues all other digits in the
DA region, such that they all compete to some degree for being selected
into the focus of attention. This competition leads to an increase of retrieval
latencies with the set size of digits held in the DA region. This set-size effect
is further compounded by representational interference (Oberauer & Kliegl,
2006). The results frommy experiment were in line with these assumptions:
When the first arithmetic operation was required immediately after the cue
that designates the relevant list, response times to that operation increased
with the length (or set size) of both lists (Oberauer, 2002).
Once people know which list will be used for the arithmetic operations,
they can afford removing the other, temporarily irrelevant list from the DA
?
3 7 4
9
−2
+5
−4
Cue-
stimulus
interval
(0.1 to 5 s) 
5 more
operations 
Recall of
all digits 
Press “2” 
Press “9” 
Press “3” 
Figure 2 Sequence of events in a trial of Experiment 2 in Oberauer (2002). The trial
has a relevant-set size of three and an irrelevant-set size of 1; the relevant set is cued by
its frames turning red (illustrated here by thick lines). The third operation involves an
object switch; the second is an object repetition.
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region, because they do not need to access its elements for the arithmetic task.
Because that list will have to be recalled at the end of the trial, however, it
must first be encoded into the activated part of LTM.This process takes about
2 s: Over the first 2 s after the cue that designates the relevant list, the set-size
effect of the irrelevant list gradually drops to zero, while the set-size effect of
the relevant list remains unchanged (Oberauer, 2002).
The WM system seems to have remarkable flexibility in swapping
contents between the DA region and activated LTM. A list of digits or
words that is not needed for processing only temporarily is still removed
from the DA region within about 2 s, as reflected in the elimination of set-
size effects. When that list is later cued as relevant for processing, it is
brought back into the DA region—and the set-size effect on reaction
times reappears (Oberauer, 2005b). With this list-switching procedure we
can also measure the time it takes to switch between two list, that is, remove
one from the DA region and replace it by another by retrieving it from
activated LTM. In two experiments, I found these list-switching costs to
3 5 72 98641
3 5 72 98641
B
A
3
Figure 3 Declarative working memory operating on a trial of Experiment 2 in
Oberauer (2002). Panel (A) illustrates the state immediately after encoding both lists.
The small circles on top are representations of digits in LTM; those included in the
present lists are activated (illustrated by shading). Digits are bound to their positions on
the screen (thick dotted lines). Panel (B) reflects the state after the irrelevant list has
been removed from the direct-access region—its bindings have been cut, but its
content, the single digit 9, remains activated in LTM. The left-most digit of the relevant
list must be accessed for processing, and the focus of attention (thick-lined oval) selects
that location and uses it as a cue to retrieve the digit bound to it.
56 Klaus Oberauer
Author's personal copy
depend on the set size of the to-be-removed list, but not on the set size of
the to-be-retrieved list (Oberauer, 2005b). The lack of a set-size effect for
the list retrieved into the DA region suggests that this list is retrieved as a
single chunk from activated LTM, an assumption to which I will return in
the section on the interaction of WM with LTM.
Evidence for the focus of attention within the DA region comes from a
further finding: When an arithmetic operation must be applied to the same
digit as in the preceding step, latencies are shorter than when a different digit
in the relevant set must be accessed. These so-called object-switch costs
(Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2003) can be interpreted as the time it takes
for the focus of attention to select a new element from the set held in the
DA region. Supporting this interpretation, the object-switch costs increase
with the length of the relevant list (Oberauer, 2003) but not with the length
of the irrelevant list (Oberauer, 2002).
Object-switch costs are found in tasks in which an item from the
memory set must be retrieved and used in a cognitive operation, and also
in tasks in which the item is updated by replacing it with a new item
(Oberauer, 2003). This shows that the objects that are selected into the
focus of attention are not specific contents—when an item is updated, its
content changes, but the object held in the focus remains the same, so that
updating the same object again is faster than updating another object in the
set. What remains constant across successive updates is the context by which
the different items are distinguished and addressed (for instance, their
boxes). Thus, what is selected by the focus is not the representation of a
digit in semantic memory, but an episodic memory object defined by
whatever is currently bound to a specific context, and this object maintains
its identity across changes of its content. In this regard, objects in the region
of direct access are similar to the object files in perceptual attention
(Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992).
2.2. Procedural Working Memory
So far I have been concerned only with the representation and selection of
the contents of cognitive activity, not the representation and selection of the
cognitive operations themselves. I venture that the procedural part of WM
can be conceptualized largely analogous to the declarative part, that is, as
three embedded components that reflect three successive levels of selection
of representations. A sketch of the architecture of WM, augmented by the
procedural part, is given in Figure 4.
The representations in the procedural part are procedures. Procedures
can be defined as (cognitive or motor) actions linked to the conditions in
which they can be applied, and to the expected outcomes. Procedures form
networks of associations in LTM, linking them sequentially and hierarchi-
cally to action plans (Schneider & Logan, 2007), and linking similar or
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equivalent procedures to each other. A subset of procedures is activated at
any time; they form the activated part of procedural LTM (for evidence
supporting the persistent activation of procedures in LTM see Woltz &
Was, 2007). Procedures can be activated by representations of goals that
they serve, as well as by stimuli to which they have been applied in the past
(Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003).
Activated procedural representations compete for control over a more
central component of the procedural system, which I call the bridge (as in
command bridge,2 or as in bridge between stimulus and response). The
bridge holds the currently operative task set, that is, the task set that is
currently in control of thought and action. A task set is a coordinated set of
2 One meaning of bridge is ‘‘the platform on a ship from which the captain and officers direct operations’’
(Oxford online dictionary, http://www.askoxford.com/).
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Say “B” 
B Say “A” 
Declarative WM Procedural WM 
B
A
G
Figure 4 Architecture of declarative and procedural working memory. For explanation of the
declarative side see Figure 1. On the procedural side, two condition-action bindings are
illustrated that link representations of condition categories A and B to the response of
saying ‘‘B’’ or ‘‘A,’’ respectively. These bindings implement the goal (G) to establish an
incompatible stimulus–response mapping (i.e., saying ‘‘B’’ in response to A, and saying
‘‘A’’ in response to B). The two responses are connected by mutually inhibitory
bindings (dotted line with nob ending). Together, these bindings constitute the current
content of the bridge. The compatible mapping is represented by associations (bowed
thin continuous lines) from declarative elements in LTM to the corresponding response
representations; these associations are instances of procedural long-term memory.
Executive processes, represented by thin broken lines, mediate between the goal G
(which could be paraphrased as: ‘‘respond to each letter by saying the other letter’’) and
the task set implementing it. In the present state of the system, the declarative element B
is selected by the focus of attention. It matches the condition of one stimulus–response
mapping in the bridge. The response bound to it is selected by the response focus
(the second large oval).
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condition–action–effect bindings (a.k.a. stimulus–response mappings) that
specify for a confined set of conditions which action or cognitive operation
to undertake, and which outcome to expect. The task set in the bridge is
implemented as a set of directly executable procedures, such that whenever
one of the conditions is represented in the focus of attention of declarative
WM, the corresponding action is automatically executed. Thus, the opera-
tive task set acts as a ‘‘prepared reflex’’ (Hommel, 1998b). This procedural
representation of a task differs from a declarative representation of the same
task as a set of (typically verbal) instructions. Declarative representations of
instructions can be instrumental in remembering what to do in which
situation (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; but see Bryck & Mayr, 2005), espe-
cially early in practice, but I assume that immediate control of (cognitive)
action lies with procedural representations, and a declarative instruction can
be effective only by guiding the construction of a corresponding procedural
representation in the bridge.
The bridge in procedural WM corresponds to the DA region in declar-
ative WM, in that it serves to establish and hold temporary bindings
between representations—here: between stimulus, response, and outcome
representations. As in the DA region, these bindings are not limited to the
learned associations in LTM. New bindings can be quickly and flexibly set
up to link any stimulus category to any arbitrary response, for instance, to
implement an experimental instruction. These bindings enable direct access
from the stimulus to the response category (and its expected effect), as long
as the particular set of bindings is upheld. The ability to form arbitrary ad hoc
bindings between mental objects and cognitive operations on them is
crucial for the flexibility of our thinking—we can make our responses to
what we represent in declarative WM depend not only on the content of
those representations but also on our current goals and intentions.
Finally, in the same way as the declarative WM system needs a mecha-
nism for selecting a single object, the procedural system needs a mechanism
for selecting a single (cognitive) action at any time. Corresponding to the
focus of attention for objects, we must assume that the selected response
attains a status that sets it temporarily apart from the competing responses in
the task set. I will refer to this mechanism as the response focus.
The set of condition–action–effect bindings established as prepared
reflexes in the bridge must be coordinated such that the conditions are
mutually exclusive categories, each of which is uniquely mapped to a
different action. This coordination is necessary to avoid cross talk from
alternative mappings that could process the same objects as input but result
in different, often incompatible operations (e.g., incrementing vs decre-
menting the population of China in the mental model discussed above).
Therefore, the content of the bridge usually is a single task set that consists of
a coordinated set of mutually exclusive condition categories, and the actions
and effects bound to them. To optimize selection of a single response,
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inhibitory links are set up between the response alternatives in the task set
(Bogacz & Gurney, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001).
Tasks and procedures activated in LTM outside the bridge cannot
directly control cognitive operations or actions—their responses are not
candidates for selection by the response focus. They can, however, influ-
ence response selection in two ways. First, if the responses of an activated
task set in LTM overlap with those of the task set currently established in the
bridge, the former can contribute to priming these responses, that is, boost
their activation without actually selecting them for execution (for a similar
view see Lien & Proctor, 2002). Second, by virtue of being activated, a task
set in LTM can be easily retrieved into the bridge (in particular when cued
by either a task cue or by a stimulus that fits the condition part of the task
set). In that case, the active task in LTM replaces the previous task set in the
bridge and takes over control.
Both kinds of effects can be observed, for instance, in the Stroop
paradigm: On incongruent trials, when the color word does not match
the print color to be named, the irrelevant but strong association between
printed words and speaking these words in LTM primes the response to
speak the printed word. If the primed response is incongruent with the
correct response (e.g., ‘‘blue’’ printed in green), correct responses are
slowed because of the time needed to overcome the competition from
the activated incorrect response. On some incongruent trials, however,
people actually read the color word instead of naming the color. On these
trials, the task to read printed words takes over the bridge, so that the
unintended task is carried out—Kane and Engle (2003) refer to this as goal
neglect. Evidence from a number of sources, reviewed by Kane and Engle,
suggests that the two effects—slowed correct naming of incongruent colors
and increased rate of word reading—are dissociable, consistent with my
assumption that activated procedures in LTM can influence processing in
two different ways, by priming responses and by displacing the current task
set in the bridge.
2.2.1. Evidence for the Components of Procedural Working Memory
Evidence supporting the embedded component structure of procedural
WM as outlined above is sparse, because procedural WM has rarely been
addressed directly by empirical studies. Much work on perceptual attention
and action selection, however, is relevant for procedural WM. In drawing
on this literature, we must bear in mind one important difference: Whereas
in studies of immediate memory, participants encode new content–context
bindings with every trial, experiments on action selection typically provide
an instruction mapping stimuli to responses at the beginning of the experi-
ment and ask participants to use the same mapping for many trials. I believe
that the latter experiments are nevertheless informative for procedural WM,
because I assume that even well-practiced stimulus–response mappings must
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be implemented as task sets in the bridge to control processing, in the same
way as well-learned declarative associations in LTM must be projected into
the DA region and maintained there by temporary bindings to be accessible
for processing. Nevertheless, in typical experiments on action selection that
use constant stimulus–response mappings it is difficult to rule out the
theoretical alternative that, after a few initial practice trials, response selec-
tion is executed merely through gradually strengthened stimulus–response
associations in LTM.
For this reason, a recent series of studies by Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran
(2007) is particularly important for bridging between the research traditions
on WM and on action selection. These authors looked at the first few trials
after instructing a new set of stimulus–response mappings and found that
stimuli activated their corresponding responses automatically. This finding
supports the idea that the task set is implemented as a set of ‘‘prepared
reflexes’’ in WM, using ad hoc bindings between stimuli and responses,
rather than emerging from gradual strengthening of associations in LTM
over many trials. Thus, the concept of the bridge as a mechanism for ad hoc
binding on the side of procedural WM, analogous to the DA region on the
declarative side, gains some plausibility, although much more work is
necessary to establish it firmly.
From the heuristic assumption that declarative and procedural WM
work according to analogous principles we can make the prediction that
the analogous components of both systems should show analogous empiri-
cal signatures. Table 2 lists the empirical signatures that I offered as evidence
for the components of declarative WM above, and aligns them with
corresponding phenomena in the domain of procedural WM. If this analogy
holds, we should expect the following three empirical signatures in proce-
dural WM: (1) Set-size effects should be observed for the number of
stimulus–responses bindings held simultaneously in the bridge, but not for
stimulus–response mappings in task sets merely activated in LTM. (2)
Switching between task sets takes time, and these switch costs increase
with the set size of the task set switched away from, but not with the set
size of the new task set. (3) Repeating a response selected previously should
be faster than switching to a new response. A fourth prediction, which so far
has no direct analogue on the declarative side, can be derived from the
assumption that the response focus holds only one response representation at
a time: Procedural WM can select only one response at a time, and this
limitation creates a bottleneck for cognitive operations. I now discuss
evidence for these four predictions (the evidence for the first two is closely
linked, so I discuss it jointly in the following section).
2.2.1.1. Set-Size Effects for Stimulus–Response Mappings and Task-Set
Switching Costs Relevant evidence for the first two predictions comes
from the task switching literature (for a review see Monsell, 2003).
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Table 2 Analogous Phenomena in Declarative and Procedural Working Memory.
Phenomenon Declarative WM Procedural WM
Set-size effects Set-size effect for relevant set of objects in DA
region
Set-size effect for number of S–R bindings in
operative task set in the bridge
No set-size effect for currently irrelevant set in
activated LTM (Oberauer, 2002)
No set-size effect for currently not operative task
set (Hu¨bner et al., 2004)
Switching structural
representations
Costs for switching between lists of items Costs for switching between task sets
Lists-switch costs increase with set size of old list
but not with set size of new list (Oberauer,
2005b)
Switch costs increase with number of S–R
bindings in old task set but not with number of
S–R bindings in new task sets (partial support
in Hu¨bner et al., 2004)
Switching focus Switch costs for focusing on new object,
increasing with set size in DA region
(Oberauer, 2002, 2003)
Response switch costs (Bertelson, 1965)
Serial selection Only one object can be selected into the focus at
the same time
Only one response can be selected at the same
time (Pashler, 1994), but there are exceptions
(Oberauer & Kliegl, 2004)
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When people switch between two tasks, only the currently relevant task set
is held in the bridge, other task sets that were recently used and are expected
to be used in the near future will be activated in procedural LTM. Switching
from one task set to another involves removing the old task set from the
bridge, and retrieving a new task set from LTM (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000).
Task-switch costs reflect to a large degree the time for this process.3
One important distinction between activated LTM and the DA region
in declarative WM is that only representations in the DA region compete
for selection into the focus, and therefore, set-size effects on access latencies
are found only for the set in the DA region, not for any additional sets held
in activated LTM. By analogy, we should expect a set-size effect for the
number of stimulus–response mappings in the currently selected task set, but
not for other active but not selected task sets. There is no study directly
addressing this prediction, but some relevant evidence can be found in a
couple of experiments by Hu¨bner, Kluwe, Luna-Rodriguez, and Peters
(2004). In their Experiment 1A, people switched between a task set with
two stimulus–response mappings and a task set with four mappings. Unsur-
prisingly, reaction times were about 200 ms longer in the task with four
mappings. In Experiment 1B, people switched between two tasks, both of
which had four mappings. Reaction times were about as large as in the four-
mapping task of Experiment 1A (although no formal comparison was made
between experiments). Thus, the number of mappings of the relevant task
set—which must be established in the bridge—had a large influence on
reaction times, but the number of mappings in the currently irrelevant task
set—which arguably is held activated in LTM, but outside the bridge—has
little or no effect on reaction times.
Task-switching situations typically engender a general cost from holding
more than one task set ready for use, compared to a situation where only a
single task set is relevant for a whole block of trials. These ‘‘global switch
costs’’ or ‘‘mixing costs’’ could be thought of as evidence against the
contention that only one task set is held in the bridge at any time in task-
switching paradigms. Rubin and Meiran (2005), however, have shown that
mixing costs do not reflect an increased load on a limited-capacity WM.
If all task sets involved in a switching experiment added to the load on the
bridge, increasing the number of task sets should increase mixing costs. This
was not the case in Rubin andMeiran’s study (for further evidence see Kray,
Li, & Lindenberger, 2002). Mixing costs increased, however, when the
stimuli were ‘‘bivalent,’’ that is, not only the currently relevant but also the
currently irrelevant task set(s) could be applied to them. This suggests that
the currently irrelevant task sets are maintained outside the bridge, but in a
3 Task-switching costs have been decomposed into several components (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000). I use
the term task-switch costs to refer to the difference between switch trials and no-switch trials on mixed blocks
at short cue-stimulus intervals (i.e., ‘‘switching costs’’ in the terminology of Meiran et al., 2000, p. 248).
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highly activated state that makes them easy to retrieve back into the bridge,
in particular when they are cued. Other experiments have shown that
stimuli fitting the conditions of the condition–action links in a task set act
as retrieval cues for these task sets when they have been used recently
(Waszak et al., 2003). Mixing costs could thus be interpreted as arising
from occasional inadvertent retrieval of a currently irrelevant task set into
the bridge, or from the extra time it takes to prevent such retrieval. When
the responses of the task sets overlap, priming of the wrong responses
along stimulus–response associations outside the bridge can additionally
contribute to mixing costs—this factor seems to play a significant role
particularly in older adults (Mayr, 2001).
Further evidence for the assumption that only relevant responses con-
tribute to response competition comes from experiments with the Stroop
paradigm (for a review see MacLeod, 1991). Color words interfere with
naming the word’s ink color only if the word refers to a color that can also
occur as an ink color. This finding can be explained by assuming that the
bridge holds stimulus–response mappings only for the colors that are
expected to occur as ink colors. Color words not occurring as ink colors
therefore cannot prime a response that belongs to the selection set in the
bridge. Roelofs (2001) reviews results with a variant of the Stroop para-
digm, picture naming in the context of interfering words. When the set of
pictures used is small and frequently repeated, words not in that set do not
interfere. With a large and rarely repeated set of pictures, however, all
words interfere with picture naming. Roelofs explains this observation by
assuming that a selection set of responses can be maintained in short-term
memory only when it is sufficiently small and frequently repeated. In the
present framework, this ‘‘short-term memory’’ would be the bridge of
procedural WM. But why does any word interfere with picture naming
when the set of pictures is large? In such a situation, the task set in the bridge
cannot specify all stimulus–response mappings individually. Rather, the task
set must include a call to declarative LTM. Expressed as a verbal rule, the
task set would be ‘‘If a picture is presented, retrieve its name from LTM
and say it aloud.’’ Interference from the distracting word arises because the
word activates a corresponding representation in declarative LTM, which
interferes with the retrieval of the name for the picture.
I assume that set-size effects in the central components of WM—the DA
region and the bridge—arise not only from competition for selection, but
also from representational interference. The latter causes increasing degra-
dation of representations with larger set size, such that only a limited
number of elements can effectively be held in the central components at
any time. Whereas there is plenty of evidence for such a capacity limit for
declarative WM, there is very little on the procedural side. Some initial
support for a capacity limit on procedural WM comes from a study by
Ellenbogen and Meiran (2008). They created a dual-task situation in which
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two speeded choice tasks had to be performed in rapid succession, and the
response of the second task (saying a color word) could be compatible or
incompatible with the stimulus of the first task (classifying the stimulus by its
color). In dual-task setups like this, backward compatibility effects are frequently
observed (Hommel, 1998a), showing that the response to the second task is
at least activated before the response to the first task is selected. Ellenbogen
and Meiran hypothesized that in this case, the cognitive system tries to hold
both task sets simultaneously in a capacity-limited WM. Doing so would be
more difficult, however, when the load on WM by the first task is raised by
increasing the number of stimulus–response mappings. Ellenbogen and
Meiran therefore predicted that the backward-compatibility effect should
disappear, and this is what they found when they increased the number of
mappings in the first task to six.
The finding of Ellenbogen andMeiran (2008) can be contrasted with the
finding of Kiesel, Wendt, and Peters (2007) in a task-switching paradigm in
which both tasks are mapped to the same set of response alternatives. In this
paradigm, congruent stimuli that are mapped to the same response by both
tasks are typically responded to faster than incongruent stimuli that are
mapped to different responses by the two tasks. Kiesel et al. found that
this congruency effect was not diminished by increasing a concurrent load on
declarative WM. The congruency effect was modulated, however, by the
relative frequency of stimulus–response pairings in previous trials. These
results suggest that, different from dual-task paradigms, task-switch para-
digms do not encourage people to hold two task sets in the bridge at the
same time; rather, congruency effects in task switching reflect the strength-
ening of stimulus–response associations of both tasks in LTM, such that each
stimulus primes the responses for both tasks. Further evidence that the
congruency effect arises from task sets that are activated in LTM has been
obtained by Meiran and Kessler (2008). They showed that the congruency
effect occurs only if the task set creating involves an abstract representation
of the response categories (e.g., ‘‘up,’’ ‘‘down’’) that is well established in
LTM either preexperimentally or through training within the experiment.
When no such representation exists in LTM, none can be activated, and
without mediation through an activated abstract response code the stimulus
representation cannot prime the corresponding response.
The second empirical signature derived from the analogy with declara-
tive WM includes the prediction that task-switch costs depend on the set
size of the task set switched away from, but not on the set size of the task set
switched to. Some evidence supporting this prediction can again be found
in the experiments by Hu¨bner et al. (2004). They asked people to switch
between a task with few stimulus–response mappings and a task with many
stimulus–response mappings and found that task-switch costs were smaller
when switching to the task with the larger number of stimulus–response
mappings. In these experiments, switching to a task set with more mappings
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implied switching away from a task with fewer mappings, so these findings
are at least consistent with the hypothesis that switch costs increase with the
set size of the task switched away from, and not with the set size of the task
switched to. A direct test of this hypothesis would require fully crossing the
set sizes (i.e., number of mappings) of both tasks, analogous to my experi-
ments on list-switch costs (Oberauer, 2005b).
In the context of set-size effects in procedural WM, and the capacity-
limiting factors they reflect, the work of Duncan and colleagues on goal
neglect is also relevant (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996;
Duncan et al., 2008). In their paradigm, participants see a series of pairs of
stimuli (e.g., two letters), each screen displaying one stimulus on the left and
one on the right side. Participants must respond to the stimuli on one side
only (e.g., name the letter on the left side). At some point in the series, a
symbol is presented centrally instead of a pair of letters, and this signals a side
change; from now on the letters on the right side must be named. The
whole series is presented at a fast pace. Goal neglect is demonstrated when
people ignore the side-change stimulus, thus continuing to respond to the
stimuli on the same side as before. Goal neglect occurs even when people
can recall at the end of the experiment the instructions on how to respond
to the side-change stimulus. This finding implies that goal neglect does not
simply arise from forgetting of the relevant instruction. Further, general
intelligence is negatively correlated with the frequency of goal neglect.
Duncan et al. (2008) showed that the probability of goal neglect depends
not on the complexity of the main task actually conducted, but on the
complexity of the task that people are instructed and given practice on. For
instance, in their Experiment 3 one group of participants was instructed, and
given brief practice with, a task-switching protocol by which they alter-
nated between reading letters and adding digits on the relevant side of each
screen, whereas another group was initially instructed on only one of these
tasks. After the practice trials both groups were told that they were going to
work on only one task (e.g., only letter reading). The group initially
instructed on the task-switching protocol committed more goal neglect.
Duncan et al. interpret their results as evidence for a capacity limit on the
ability to establish a task model based on instructions. When the task model’s
complexity exceeds capacity, it is simplified by dropping some part of it, for
instance, the side-change rule.
In the framework I propose here, Duncan’s goal-neglect paradigm can
be understood as a task-switching paradigm. Work on each trial starts with
the task set for the main task (e.g., letter reading) in the bridge. When the
side-change symbol comes up, people must rapidly switch tasks, that is,
retrieve the side-change task set from procedural LTM into the bridge;
execution of that task set shifts visual attention to the other side. On this
analysis, goal neglect can be understood as a failure to retrieve the task set for
the side change. Given the high time pressure in this paradigm, such failure
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becomes more likely in people who process the main task more slowly,
because they will still be busy completing the last operation of the main task
when the side-change symbol appears, and because general intelligence is
correlated with processing speed, this can explain the correlation of goal
neglect with intelligence. Successful retrieval of the side-change task set also
depends on an association between the retrieval cue (i.e., the side-change
symbol) and the task set, which can be established during the practice trials,
or through mental practice in response to the instructions. The effect of
instruction complexity could arise because people who received more
complex instructions suffer from more representational interference in the
bridge during practice and therefore are less likely to accomplish the
practice trials correctly. In particular, they are less likely to do the side-
change correctly in the practice phase. As a consequence, they have weaker
associations between the side-change symbol and the side-change task set,
and thus are more likely to commit goal neglect.
2.2.1.2. Response-Switch Costs It has long been known that repeating
the same response in a series of choice reaction-time tasks results in a benefit
of about 100 ms, even when the stimulus triggering that response changes
between trials (Bertelson, 1965). This response-repetition benefit, or
response-switch cost, can be regarded as the analogue to object-switch
costs, or object-repetition benefits, in declarative WM. Response-
repetition benefits seem to be smaller than object-repetition benefits, and
they do not last long, suggesting that the response focus does not hold on to
a response representation after it has been executed as long as the focus of
attention holds on to a declarative representation after it has been used in a
cognitive operation.
Recent research on the response-repetition benefit has revealed that it
disappears, or is even reversed, when the task set used to select the response,
or the stimulus category demanding the response, is changed (Kleinsorge,
1999; Schuch & Koch, 2004). These findings imply that the representation
held in the response focus cannot be a representation of the physical
response (e.g., a motor program or an action plan) but rather must be a
representation of the ‘‘meaning’’ of the response (Schuch & Koch, 2004).
For instance, when an odd–even judgment on digits is followed by a large–
small judgment, pressing the left key could mean ‘‘odd’’ on the first trial, but
mean ‘‘large’’ on the second trial. Therefore, repeating the same physical
response does not incur a repetition benefit. I conclude from these findings
that the representation in the response focus is a representation of the
decision or conclusion that the procedural system has arrived at by proces-
sing a declarative representation through the currently operative task set.
That decision or conclusion can be, but does not have to be, linked to a
physical action. A physical action resulting from a decision, and its expected
outcome, must be part of the task set that controls overt actions, and there
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must be a mechanism to select the appropriate physical action over
competing alternatives, but that mechanism apparently does not hold on
to the selected representation after its execution, and therefore does not give
rise to repetition benefits for the actions themselves when their meaning
changes.
2.2.1.3. Response-Selection Bottleneck The fourth prediction moti-
vated by the analogy between declarative and procedural WM is that the
response focus selects only one response at a time. Evidence for this
prediction comes from the dual-task literature, which strongly points to
the existence of a response-selection bottleneck for even very simple choice
tasks (Byrne & Anderson, 2001; Pashler, 1994). Evidence for a bottleneck
also exists for purely cognitive operations that update representations in
WM (Oberauer & Go¨the, 2006). The evidence that objects in declarative
WM can be updated only one at a time suggests that not only responses in
the response focus but also objects in the focus of attention are selected one
at a time, thus providing preliminary evidence for a bottleneck on object
selection that is analogous to the bottleneck on response selection (see the
bottom-left cell of Table 2).
Neither the presumed object-selection bottleneck nor the response-
selection bottleneck, however, is immutable. Using a memory-updating
paradigm similar to that of Oberauer and Go¨the (2006) but with reduced
memory load, my colleagues and I found that young adults (but not old
adults) can, with substantial practice, acquire the ability to update one digit
and one spatial position inWM simultaneously without mutual interference
between these processes (Go¨the, Oberauer, & Kliegl, 2007; Oberauer &
Kliegl, 2004).
The theoretical framework developed here provides some guidelines for
explaining why, and under which circumstances, overcoming the selection
bottlenecks should be possible. The bottlenecks are assumed to arise not
from hard-wired architectural constraints but from the functional con-
straints on the attentional mechanisms in WM. The function of these
mechanisms is to unambiguously select an object for processing in declara-
tive WM, and a response in procedural WM. Limiting the contents of the
two foci to a single representation is a straightforward way of avoiding
selection ambiguity, and likewise, limiting the content of the bridge to a
single task set is an effective way of avoiding cross talk between task sets
(cf. Logan & Gordon, 2001). These constraints, however, can be relaxed in
situations where ambiguity and cross talk are highly unlikely. A digit and a
spatial position are unlikely to be confused. Moreover, in our experiment
people only held one digit and one spatial position in declarativeWM at any
time, thus minimizing the selection demand on the focus of attention
because of a lack of competitors. Under these conditions, the focus of
attention can hold a digit and a spatial position jointly without creating
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selection ambiguity. Likewise, an arithmetic computation and a shift of an
object in space are unlikely to create cross talk because the shift cannot be
applied to the numerical value of the digit, and the spatial location cannot be
affected by an arithmetic operation. Therefore, the system can, with suffi-
cient practice on the specific task combination, learn to relax its default
cautionary setting and hold two objects in the focus of attention and two
task sets in the bridge, and select two responses into the response focus
simultaneously.
According to this view, whether parallel processing is possible depends
not on the individual tasks but on the distinctiveness of representations and
processes in a task combination. Consistent with this view, practice on the
task combination, not practice on the individual tasks, enabled parallel
processing (Oberauer & Kliegl, 2004). Moreover, in an unpublished
follow-up study combining the digit updating task with a letter updating
task, people could not perform both tasks in parallel even after extended
practice (Brambosch, 2003). This finding shows that the distinctiveness of
the two task sets is an important prerequisite for acquiring parallel processing.
2.2.2. Executive Processes
Speaking about WM one cannot avoid speaking of executive processes,
because the two terms have been so closely linked in the literature. Some
use the terms executive processes or executive functions in a very encompassing
way that treats the whole of WM as one instance of them. Nothing is to be
gained for an understanding of WM from using that concept. Others use the
term central executive to refer to the processing mechanism(s) of WM, setting
them apart from the storage mechanisms (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1997).
Used in this way, the term roughly coincides with my concept of procedural
WM, and that is why I placed my discussion of executive function in this
section. It is worth noting, however, that Baddeley (1986) originally mod-
eled his central executive after the Supervisor Attentional System (Norman
& Shallice, 1980), which is meant to supervise and control ongoing cogni-
tive processes rather than execute them itself.
In keeping with the general idea of Norman and Shallice, I find it useful
to distinguish between primary processes and executive processes. I call
primary processes those that take declarative representations (either from
perception or from declarative WM) as input and produce manipulations
of declarative representations or overt actions as output. In contrast, I call
executive processes those that have as their output a manipulation of the
conditions of primary processes. Executive processes can change the
conditions of primary processes by changing their parameters (Logan &
Gordon, 2001), such as changing the speed-accuracy trade-off criterion.
Alternatively, executive processes can control primary processes by
changing the representations in declarative or procedural WM that guide
the primary processes, such as manipulating the activation levels of
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representations in LTM, and updating the contents of the DA region or the
bridge.
Individual-differences research has distinguished three categories of
executive function tasks: updating of WM, inhibition of prepotent responses,
and task-set switching (Friedman et al., 2006; Miyake et al., 2000). All three
categories of tasks involve establishing a new representation that is necessary
for an intended task against a conflicting old representation that is irrelevant
or misguiding. Whereas updating refers to replacing old representations in
declarative WM by new ones, inhibition and switching refer to establishing
new representations in procedural WM in competition with old ones. The
difference between inhibition and switching is that inhibition tasks require
establishing a new task set in the bridge against a habitual response tendency
intruding from procedural LTM, whereas switching requires establishing a
new task set against another task set that is currently held in the bridge, but
does not necessarily have a strong representation in LTM. Thus, inhibition
requires implementing the intended task set in the bridge strongly, so that a
highly activated but unintended procedure in LTM is not inadvertently
retrieved into the bridge and takes over control. Task-switching involves
replacing the current task set in the bridge by a new one; thus, it can be
conceptualized as updating procedural WM.
Table 3 presents a proposed taxonomy of demands on declarative and
procedural WM, as reflected in tasks used to study WM or executive
functions. The common denominator of these tasks is that they require
maintaining goal-relevant representations in a state of immediate avail-
ability. The representations whose maintenance is performance limiting
can be either declarative (in the first column) or procedural (in the second
column). The first row includes tasks that are primarily limited by the ability
to maintain representations available, without a large role for competition.
The tasks in the second row, Overcoming Competition, add to this the
requirement of overcoming distraction by competing representations that
become strongly activated by misleading stimuli, misleading associations, or
both. The third row, Updating,4 combines maintenance with the require-
ment to update representations. This class of tasks is interesting because they
focus on a fundamental dilemma of WM, to strike the balance between
holding on to representations and replacing them by new ones (Dreisbach &
Goschke, 2004; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2002).
The tasks regarded in the literature as reflecting executive functions are
found in the second and third row of the table, reflecting Overcoming
Competition and Updating, respectively, in addition to the maintenance
demand common to all three rows. The demands in the bottom two rows
4 I use the term Updating in capital letters to refer to the category of tasks in the bottom row of Table 3, which
involve updating of either declarative or procedural WM, and updating in lower-case to refer to the updating
factor in Miyake et al. (2000), which includes only updating of declarative WM.
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Table 3 Taxonomy of Demands on WM.
Demands Declarative WM Procedural WM Common required function
Maintenance Short-term recall or recognition Hold new task set to guide action Activation, binding
Digit span, Sternberg recognition
paradigm
Speeded choice RT with arbitrary
S–R mapping
Maintenance þ
Overcoming
competition
Overcoming proactive interference
from LTM
Overcoming prepotent responses
(‘‘inhibition’’)
Strong binding, executive
processes
PI paradigm, recent probes task,a
modified Sternberg task,b storage þ
processing paradigmsc (?)
Stroop task, antisaccade task
Maintenance þ
Updating
Replacing old contents of
declarative WM by new ones
(‘‘updating’’)
Replacing old task sets by new
ones (‘‘switching’’)
Flexible binding and
unbinding, executive
processes
Keep-track,d memory-updatinge Task-set switching paradigm
Note: Example tasks are given in italics; brief descriptions of not commonly known tasks follow.
a The recent-probes task is a variant of the Sternberg recognition task in which negative probes of the current trial were included in memory lists on recent trials, thus
producing misleading familiarity.
b In the modified Sternberg task, participants encode two lists, one of which is post-cued to be forgotten. Recognition probes from the to-be-forgotten list create
misleading familiarity.
c Storageþ processing paradigms (e.g., reading span, operation span) combine immediate recall of short lists with episodes of a typically unrelated processing task either in
between or after presentation of list items. The status of storageþ processing paradigms is uncertain: If the concurrent processing task leaves traces in WM that compete
for recall with the to-be-remembered list items, the task reflects overcoming competition; otherwise it just reflects maintenance.
d In keep-track, participants see a list of nouns and must remember the last noun in each of a number of categories.
e In memory updating, participants remember several digits and update them individually by arithmetic operations.
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have in common that they require the frequent intervention of processes
that take goal representations as input and generate strong goal-appropriate
representations in WM as output, in other words, executive processes.
There is, however, an important difference betweenOvercoming Competition
and Updating: Performance in tasks that require overcoming competition
must be assumed to depend on two factors, the effectiveness of executive
processes in establishing the goal-relevant representation, and the ability of
the WM system to hold and maintain strong bindings that can overcome
prepotent memories or response tendencies from LTM. The ability to
maintain strong bindings is, in my view, the main limiting factor of WM
capacity. Thus, tasks measuring the ability to overcome competition reflect
a mixture of two variables, the efficiency of executive functions and the
capacity of WM. In Updating tasks, in contrast, having highWM capacity is
unlikely to be helpful. A person with high capacity would have the disad-
vantage of having to overcome strong bindings to remove the old content of
the DA region or the bridge, but the advantage of being able to strongly
bind the new content. A person with low capacity would have to overcome
weaker bindings with a weaker mechanism to establish new bindings. There
is no reason to assume that one or the other will be more effective in
updating. In other words, whereas in overcoming-competition tasks, the
WM system fights conflicting tendencies from external sources, in updating
tasks, WM fights itself. Therefore, Updating tasks could be regarded as a
relatively pure reflection of executive functions because performance is
unlikely to be affected by WM capacity. The only determinant of success
in Updating tasks should be the speed and accuracy of executive processes
that decide on and carry out the updating.
Do executive processes have a special status in the cognitive system? One
might argue that they do not. In this view, executive processes use the same
mechanisms as primary processes, they just happen to have responses that
control the cognitive system itself rather than some aspect of the environ-
ment. A consequence of this view is that executive processes must share
with primary processes the limited capacities of declarative and procedural
WM. In particular, the bottleneck in the bridge would force the system to
alternate between task-sets for primary processes and task-sets for executive
processes. This idea raises the question how the switch between primary and
executive task sets is managed—it seems that an executive process is needed
to switch from a primary to an executive process. This looks like very
bad design.
For an efficient WM system we need to assume that at least some
executive functions avail of a separate mechanism that enables them to
run in parallel with primary processes, so that they can intervene in primary
processes. This assumption is in agreement with theory and data on at least
one executive process, stopping an action. Logan and Cowan (1984) ana-
lyzed the stop-signal paradigm, in which participants do a speeded choice
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task and are instructed to stop responding when they perceive a stop signal,
which occurs on a minority of trials. Logan and Cowan successfully applied
a race model to data from this paradigm in which the primary response-
selection process and the stop process run in parallel.
Not all executive processes, however, seem to have the privileged status
of being independent of primary processes. Monitoring of one’s perfor-
mance, and correction of errors, can be regarded as a prime example of an
executive function. It has long been known that when people commit an
error in a series of simple choice tasks, they slow down on the following
trials (Laming, 1968). This posterror slowing has been interpreted as reflect-
ing an adjustment of the speed-accuracy trade-off setting to avoid further
errors. A recent study by Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009), however, casts
doubt on this interpretation. They showed that posterror slowing is more
likely a manifestation of a processing bottleneck: After an error, processes
interpreting the error and making adjustments occupy the processing
bottleneck for some time, thus postponing processing of the next stimulus.
It seems that at least some executive processes compete with primary
processes for the bridge in procedural WM.
To conclude, an analysis of functional necessities, as well as some
empirical evidence, point to the existence of a separate mechanism for
executive processes in addition to declarative and procedural WM, such
that executive processes can run in parallel with primary processes. This
mechanism, however, seems not to be used by all processes that are regarded
as executive in the literature, and that match my definition proposed above.
Future research will hopefully distinguish between executive processes that
must share mechanisms with primary processes and others that do not, and
this might provide a more robust basis for classifying cognitive processes
than the crude distinction into primary and executive processes that I can
offer at this point.
2.2.3. Are Declarative and Procedural Working Memory
Separate Systems?
I have assumed so far that, at least for the central components of the WM
system, declarative and procedural WM are parallel but separate systems. An
alternative is that there is only one WM system that is used for both
declarative and procedural representations. Thus, there would be no signif-
icant difference between bindings linking memory objects to their contexts,
and bindings linking objects to (cognitive) actions to be performed on them,
and the two kinds of bindings would share the same limited capacity, that is,
they would interfere with each other. Moreover, there would be a single
focus of attention that selects a composite of a mental object and an
associated cognitive operation to be performed on it. Thus, objects and
operations would not be selected independently but as tightly packed units.
This latter view is suggested by the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel,
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Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), which proposes that perceived
objects and events and the actions we perform (or plan to perform) on
them are represented as integrated event codes.
One straightforward prediction of the independence assumption is
that increasing the load on declarative WM should not affect the effi-
ciency of executing a task set held in procedural WM, and conversely,
increasing the load on procedural WM should not impair retention of
information in declarative WM. This prediction is complicated some-
what by the fact that, whereas task sets are units of procedural knowl-
edge, task instructions are instances of declarative knowledge. Often, in
particular for novel and not yet practiced tasks, people hold the (usually
verbal) task instruction in declarative WM to back up the task set that
implements that instruction. Increasing the load on declarative WM
could disrupt memory for the task instruction, and as long as instruction
memory contributes to task performance, the latter would be impaired.
Likewise, making the task set more complex usually implies making the
instruction more complex, and thus a more complex task would create
more interference with other contents of declarative WM if the person
attempts to hold the task instruction in declarative WM. Therefore, an
informative test of the above prediction would have to involve a well-
practiced task for the manipulation of procedural complexity, which no
longer relies on declarative instructions. Alternatively, a nonverbal WM
load that does not interfere with verbal instructions held in declarative
WM could be used to manipulate declarative WM load. As far as I am
aware, no such study has yet been conducted.
Results from individual-differences research turn out to be more infor-
mative. Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Su¨ß, and Wittmann (2007) ana-
lyzed the relationship between measures of (declarative) WM capacity and
reaction times in speeded two-choice tasks with arbitrary stimulus–response
mappings. The choice tasks arguably rely at least in part on the robustness of
stimulus–response bindings in procedural WM. Schmiedek et al. applied the
diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) to the reaction time distributions to isolate
the decision component from other components of variance in reaction
times; the decision component presumably reflects the strength of stimulus–
response bindings. In a structural equation model, a latent factor for the
decision component correlated highly, but not perfectly, with a latent factor
reflecting WM capacity. This finding suggests that the ability to maintain
bindings in declarative and in procedural WM share a substantial amount of
variance. Further support for this conclusion comes from a study by
Wilhelm and Oberauer (2006), who related speed in four-choice tasks
with compatible and with arbitrary stimulus–response mappings to measures
of (declarative) WM capacity. Choice tasks with arbitrary mappings yielded
much larger reaction times than those with compatible mappings. A factor
reflecting individual differences in the size of the compatibility effect was
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highly correlated with WM capacity. This observation is again consistent
with the view that there is a common source of variance in the ability
to maintain temporary bindings in declarative and in procedural WM.
It should be added, however, that a common source of variance does not
imply a common mechanism. It is possible that declarative and procedural
WM are separate mechanisms that are affected by the same source of
individual differences (e.g., global neural noise affecting different neural
networks in the same way).
Evidence pointing more toward a distinction between declarative and
procedural WM comes from a series of studies of Miyake and colleagues
(Friedman et al., 2006, 2008; Miyake et al., 2000). In these studies, the
updating factor and the task-set switching factor were always distinct, though
correlated. According to the taxonomy in Table 3, these two factors reflect
the Updating demand for declarative and procedural WM, respectively.
Further, Friedman and Miyake (2004) found that a latent factor reflecting
resistance to proactive interference was uncorrelated with their inhibition
factor. These two factors could be interpreted as representing the
Overcoming-Conflict demand in declarative and procedural WM, respec-
tively, and their lack of correlation would reflect a dissociation between
declarative and procedural WM. The latter result is ambiguous, however,
because the proactive-interference measure was obtained from delayed
recall tasks that arguably reflect more the robustness of new LTM associa-
tions than the robustness of temporary bindings in declarative WM.
A brain-imaging study by Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides,
and Smith (2003) provides more direct evidence for a dissociation of
mechanisms for overcoming conflict in declarative and procedural WM.
Using the Sternberg recognition paradigm, they created conflict in declara-
tive WM by presenting probes that were not in the current memory list but
in the preceding memory list. These recent negative probes create a conflict
between familiarity and recollection. Overcoming the misleading familiarity
signal requires strong recollection, which rests on strong bindings between
memory items and their list contexts (cf. Oberauer, 2005a). In addition,
Nelson and colleagues created conflict in procedural WM by presenting
negative probes that were positive probes on the preceding trial, such that
the correct response on the present trial conflicts with the correct response
on the preceding trial to the same stimulus. Overcoming response conflict
arguably requires a strong task set to minimize the influence of the stimulus–
response association carrying over from the preceding trial. Nelson et al.
(2003) found that conflict between familiarity and recollection increased
activation in prefrontal cortex, whereas response conflict increased activa-
tion in anterior cingulated cortex. This result suggests that different brain
circuits are involved in resolving conflict in declarative and proceduralWM.
Overall, there is surprisingly little evidence speaking directly to the
degree of independence of declarative and procedural WM. My preference
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for the assumption of two separate systems, though consistent with extant
findings, is motivated mainly on theoretical grounds: Being able to select
declarative representations (i.e., the objects of thought) and procedural
representations (i.e., our actions on them) independently seems a desirable
feature for a WM system, because it enables us to select an object of thought
without deciding at the same time on how to mentally manipulate it or how
to act on it. Having separate representational systems and selection mechan-
isms for declarative and procedural representations is a straightforward way
of realizing this independence.
3. Working Memory and Long-Term Memory
There is an increasing recognition that the processes attributed toWM
are rarely free from contributions from LTM (Burgess & Hitch, 2005;
Unsworth & Engle, 2007). In my view, there are two ways in which
LTM contributes to the functioning of WM, through activation of existing
representations, and through learning of new structural information that can
be retrieved back into WM.
3.1. Activated Long-Term Memory
I see three roles of activated representations in LTM for processes that are
usually attributed to WM, such as immediate recall or recognition. The first
role is to increase the efficiency of processing new stimuli matching already
activated representations. This role is manifest in short-term priming
(McKone, 1998). In addition, the perceived increase in processing fluency
for stimuli matching already activated representations seems to be an
important ingredient of their familiarity (Whittlesea et al., 1990).
The familiarity signal generated in response to a stimulus can be used as
one source of information for recognition decisions because familiarity is
correlated with recency of use. For short-term recognition (i.e., recognition
decisions following within seconds after initial encoding of the memory
items), processing fluency, and thus familiarity, will be mainly determined
by the degree of activation of the memory items in LTM. A further source
of information for recognition is recollection, that is, retrieval of episodes of
encountering the stimulus before in a relevant context (e.g., the context of
the last seen memory list). For short-term recognition, recollection implies
retrieving memory items from the DA region, which provides bindings
between the items and their contexts. The distinction between activated
LTM and the region of direct access receives support by studies of short-
term recognition that fit this brief sketch of a dual-process model of
recognition (Oberauer, 2001, 2008; Oberauer & Lange, 2009).
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A second role for activation in LTM is that activated representations
narrow down the search set for reconstruction of memory traces in the DA
region. Representations in the DA region can be degraded by representa-
tional interference, and in that case retrieval involves recovery of the
complete representation by retrieving the best-matching representation in
LTM—this form of pattern completion is often referred to as redintegration
(Lewandowsky, 1999). Having a limited set of activated candidate repre-
sentations makes redintegration faster and less error prone. Using the
ordering of countries by population as a simplified example: Imagine that
the representations of countries in the DA region consisted only of their
names, and due to interference, at some point the structure consists of
degraded memory traces reading: ‘‘I_D__, CH__A, R_S___.’’ Matching
these traces against the whole vocabulary of the language would make
recovery very difficult, but having a search set limited to countries renders
the task easier.
A third role for activation in LTM is to provide a limited mechanism for
representing serial order. A list of items can be represented in order by
imposing a gradient of activation on them, declining from the first to the
last. The items can be reproduced in that order by retrieving the one with
the highest activation and then suppressing it, thus leaving the next in line
with the highest activation. This mechanism has been used in models of
forward serial recall of lists (Grossberg & Stone, 1986; Page & Norris, 1998).
Activation gradients, however, are limited in that they do not provide
direct access to a specific element—to access the fourth element in a list, for
example, retrieval has to proceed from the beginning until it reaches the
fourth element. Activation gradients also cannot represent multidimen-
sional structures, such as the location of various elements in two-dimen-
sional space. A powerful mechanism for representing structure requires the
ability to establish links between representations. Temporary bindings
establish these links in the DA region. To maintain structural representa-
tions after they have been removed from the DA region, they must be
established in LTM by more permanent associations—and indeed, more is
needed than just associations, as I will explain next.
3.2. Structural Information in Long-Term Memory
So far, I have characterized LTM as an associative network of representations.
But information in LTM must consist of more than just associations. LTM
must be able to retain the specific relations between elements—for instance,
who did what to whom when and where in an episode. One of the six
requirements of a working memory system is that structural information can
be learned over the long term. Associations are not enough to accomplish
this. For instance, the fact that the pastor calmed the businessman cannot be
represented by associating ‘‘pastor,’’ ‘‘calm,’’ and ‘‘businessman,’’ because that
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assembly could not be distinguished from one that represents ‘‘The business-
man calmed the pastor.’’ The representation must specify the kind of relation
between the concepts to distinguish different structures involving the same
concepts. Thus, LTM must represent structures.
Does this imply that representations in LTM are structural representa-
tions? Not necessarily—indeed, structural representations are an inconve-
nient way of representing structures in LTM. A structural representation
means that content components (i.e., objects, events) are linked to their
contexts or roles by learned associations. For instance, ‘‘pastor’’ could be
associated to the agent role in a proposition template, ‘‘businessman’’ to the
patient role, and ‘‘calming’’ to the action role, to represent the fact that the
pastor calmed the businessman. It is tempting to think of long-term learning
in this way, because then all we needed is a mechanism that copies the
bindings in the DA region into corresponding associations in LTM.
This scheme, however, would soon run into trouble when the system
learns many more facts and events concerning the pastor and the businessman.
Other events to be remembered could, for instance, involve the pastor in the
patient role and the businessman in the agent role (e.g., thebusinessmanbribing
the pastor). Across all facts and events in memory, each object or concept
would be associated to different roles, and each role to numerous objects and
concepts, thus creatingmassive interference.To recover the fact that the pastor
calmed the businessman (in one particular time and place), the system needs a
mechanism to tell that the association of ‘‘businessman’’ with patient belongs
together with the association of ‘‘pastor’’ to agent (as well as the association of
information about time and place to the roles of time and place). In other words,
there must be a mechanism to associate pair-wise content-role associations
with each other. Because associations are not themselves representations, it is
not obvious how they can be associated together. Therefore, long-term
learning of structural information cannot simply consist of translating the
bindings in WM into corresponding associations one-to-one.
3.2.1. Chunking Structural Representations
One solution to the problem of acquiring structural representations in LTM
is to form unitized representations of structures, which I call chunks (Halford
et al., 1998; Miller, 1956). A chunk is a representational unit in which other
units and their relations are packed so that they are not individually accessi-
ble—unless the chunk is unpacked again. Remembering structures as
chunks requires that, for every new fact or episode, a new unitized repre-
sentation must be created. Upon encountering for the first time an episode
in which the pastor calms the businessman, the system must create a new
chunk representing that proposition. The proposition chunk would be
associated with the representations of the three concepts involved
(i.e., pastor, calming, and businessman). In addition, it needs to be associated
with representations that code the conjunction of each concept with its role
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in the proposition (i.e., the conjunction of ‘‘pastor’’ with agent, of ‘‘busi-
nessman’’ with patient, and of ‘‘calming’’ with action). An illustration of how
a relational representation in the DA region of WM is encoded as a chunk in
LTM is given in Figure 5A (a similar structure of memory is proposed by
Hummel & Holyoak, 2003).
There are several ways in which learning by chunking could be imple-
mented in a neural network. With localist representations (i.e., each content
component is represented by a single unit in the network), forming a new
chunk means recruiting a new, as yet uncommitted unit to become the new
chunk representation (Grossberg, 1987). With distributed representations
(i.e., each content component is represented by a pattern of activation across
many units), the new chunk could be represented by a new pattern created
from its component patterns, for instance, by circular convolution ( Jones &
Mewhort, 2007; Plate, 2003).
3.2.2. Retrieval of Structural Information from LTM
Figure 5B illustrates how structural information from LTM can be retrieved
back into the DA region of WM. The current contents of the DA region
serve as retrieval cues for chunks in LTM. Using as cues only the content
elements currently bound to some position or role in theDA region, however,
would lead to confusion. For instance, when the DA region currently holds a
mental model of a businessman calming a priest, the three content elements
(priest, calming, and businessman)would cue a chunk representing the propo-
sition ‘‘the priest calmed the businessman’’ and a chunk representing ‘‘the
businessman calmed the priest’’ with equal strength. To focus retrieval better
on those memories in LTM that match the current contents of thought with
regard to their relations, the relations between concepts and roles in the DA
region must act as additional cues. For this, the temporary bindings between
content and role representations must first be translated into representations
that code the conjunction of each concept and its current role. This is the same
process as occurs during encoding of a structure as a chunk in LTM. One
prediction from this assumption is that, when LTM is cued by a relational
cue (e.g., a sentence or a pair of words), retrieval of memories matching the
individual elements should be faster than retrieval of memories matching
the relation between them, because the latter requires ad hoc chunking of the
relational information in the cue as an intermediate step. This prediction is
confirmed by several studies (e.g., Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; Gronlund,
Edwards, & Ohrt, 1997; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999).
To summarize, I assume that one important difference between the
DA region and LTM is that in the DA region, structural information is
represented explicitly, that is, by structural representations, whereas in
LTM it is packed into chunks. Thus, although LTM contains information
much richer than mere associations between ideas, its structure is purely
associative—it is a network of associated chunks. Transferring structural
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information from the DA region into LTM means packing the structure
into a chunk. Retrieving of structural information from LTMmeans cueing
a chunk with the current contents of the DA region, and their bindings, and
Pastor 
Calm 
Business
man
Agent Action Patient
Chunk1 
A
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Reassure 
Chair
man
Agent Action Patient
B
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Soothe 
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Chunk1 
B1
B2
B3
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Figure 5 (A) The proposition ‘‘The pastor calmed the businessman’’ is represented in
the direct-access region by binding the three concepts (pastor, calm, businessman) to
their roles in a proposition template (agent, action, patient). Bindings are represented
by thick dotted lines. To encode this proposition into LTM, a chunk is formed that
includes information about the concepts, as well as about the bindings of each concept
to its role (it is arbitrarily called chunk1). The bindings must first be translated into
representations (B1 to B3). This conversion is represented by the thin-dotted lines. All
representations packed into the chunk (pastor, calm, businessman, B1, B2, B3) are
associated to that chunk; associations are shown as continuous lines. (B) When a new
proposition is represented in the direct-access region, it cues related chunks in LTM for
retrieval. A good analogy such as ‘‘The rabbi reassured the chairman’’ (illustrated on
the left) cues chunk1 with both its concepts and its bindings (again mediated through
explicit representations of these bindings, B1 to B3). A bad analogy such as ‘‘The
executive soothed the priest’’ (on the right) cues chunk1 only by its concepts.
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selecting the most strongly cued chunk to be unpacked into the DA region.
Unpacking the chunk means to recreate the original structural representa-
tion in the DA region. This theory implies that relational information can
be maintained in LTM, but it can be accessed for processing only after being
projected back into the DA region. The DA region serves as a projection
screen of our structural knowledge, thus enabling us to think about struc-
tures, that is, extract information about individual relations in a structure
and manipulating individual components and relations in that structure.
3.2.3. Evidence for Chunking and Unpacking
Evidence for the mechanisms of encoding structural information into LTM
by chunking, and retrieving it by cueing and unpacking, comes from three
sources: analogical retrieval, the Hebb effect in list learning, and retrieval
times for lists; I will discuss them in turn.
In analogical reasoning, people represent one structure inWM and try to
retrieve some knowledge from LTM that matches the structure of the
current representation in WM. For instance, when trying to figure out
the physics of magma flowing down a volcano, the physics of water flowing
down the drain could be a helpful analogue—although its elements differ,
its causal structure is similar to the magma problem. Early research on the
retrieval of analogues suggested that people are poor at finding structural
matches in LTM. Instead, what mostly comes to mind seem to be memories
that bear some surface similarity to the problem at hand, that is, similarity
between the elements involved regardless of their structure. For instance,
when reading a story, people are often reminded of other stories involving
the same elements (e.g., the same animals) but rarely of stories that have an
analogous causal structure but no shared elements (Gentner, Ratterman, &
Forbus, 1993). Later research, however, led to a revision of this picture,
showing that retrieval is sensitive to structural similarity between the cues
and the to-be-retrieved memory. For instance, Wharton et al. (1994) found
that, when given the sentence, ‘‘The pastor calmed the businessman,’’
people are more often reminded of a previously read sentence, ‘‘The rabbi
reassured the chairman’’ than another previously read sentence, ‘‘The
executive soothed the priest.’’ The two sentences in LTM have about
equal similarity of their elements to the given sentence, but they differ in
their structural similarity to the given sentence. Other research shows that
analogues can be retrieved on the basis of structural similarity alone, without
any similarity between the elements (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000;
Catrambone, 2002). Thus, there is evidence that retrieval from LTM is
sensitive to the structure of the cue. This finding supports the assumption
that not only the content elements currently held in the DA region, but also
their bindings to their context, contribute to the cueing of chunks in LTM.
Evidence for chunking also comes from the literature on memory for
lists. Lists can be thought of as structures in which a set of content elements
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(i.e., list items) is linked to an ordered set of positions. One possible way of
encoding lists into LTM is to build long-term associations between each
item and its positions. When learning many different lists created by ran-
domly reordering the same items—as in a typical experiment with many
trials of immediate serial recall of digit lists—every item will eventually be
associated with about equal strength to each position, making LTM virtually
useless. However, if some items are placed in certain positions more often
than in others, cumulative learning of these item-position associations
would help remembering new lists in which the items are placed in these
positions (Burgess & Hitch, 1999). This could be an explanation for the
Hebb effect (Hebb, 1961): When across a series of trials of immediate serial
recall the same list is repeated frequently (e.g., every third trial), perfor-
mance on the repeated list selectively improves over trials. The explanation
of the Hebb effect in terms of pair-wise long-term associations between
items and positions, however, has received a serious blow by the finding
that there is no cumulative learning when only every second item of a list is
repeated in a constant position (Cumming, Page, & Norris, 2003). This and
other findings (Hitch, Fastame, & Flude, 2005) have led Burgess and Hitch
(2006) to revise their earlier account of the Hebb effect in terms of item-
position associations. The revised model assumes instead that each list is
remembered in LTM in a unitized form (i.e., a chunk). Repeated lists
benefit from long-term knowledge to the degree that their initial items
serve as retrieval cues for an existing list chunk in LTM. Thus, data and
theorizing on serial recall converge with my analysis above on the conclu-
sion that the representation of structures in LTM requires chunking.
Further evidence for the idea that structures are represented in LTM as
unified chunks comes from retrieval times for lists from LTM. Several
studies have compared the time for accessing memory lists from WM
with the time for accessing the same lists from LTM. Access from LTM
takes longer, but the additional time, which is assumed to reflect the time for
retrieving a list from LTM into WM, does not depend on the length of the
list (Conway & Engle, 1994; Oberauer, 2005b; Wickens, Moody, & Dow,
1981). This finding suggests that a list is retrieved as a single chunk,
unpacking of which regenerates the list as a structure in the DA region.
The unpacking process itself seems to proceed in parallel because otherwise,
longer lists would take more time to unpack.5
5 There are intriguing hints in the literature pointing to the existence of a simpler, purely associative learning
mechanism alongside the mechanism for learning structures by chunking that I postulated above (Botvinick &
Bylsma, 2005; Majerus, van der Linden, Mulder, Meulemans, & Peters, 2004). The associative learning system
would gradually strengthen the association of all representations that cooccur in the DA region, thus picking up
the probabilistic structure of the environment (insofar as it is reflected in the representation in the DA region).
Exploring the role of this second learning system for the interaction ofWM and LTM goes beyond the scope of
this chapter.
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3.3. Control of Encoding into and Retrieval from
Long-Term Memory
Retrieval from LTM means that an LTM representation is projected into
the DA region. Conversely, long-term learning means that the contents of
the DA region are added to the representations in LTM. The WM system
must have a mechanism to control the transfer between these two compo-
nents. Research on incidental memory (Hebb, 1961; Hyde & Jenkins,
1969) and implicit memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Roediger, 1990)
shows that every content of thought leaves a trace in LTM by default.
Thus, translating the contents of the DA region into a corresponding trace
in LTM seems to be the default mode of interaction between these two
components.
Conversely, there is much evidence showing that long-term memories
influence performance in immediate memory tasks. For instance, the Hebb
effect mentioned earlier (Hebb, 1961) implies that memory traces of a
repeated list support immediate recall of that list on further trials. Yet, it
cannot be the case that any matching LTM content is automatically
retrieved into the DA region, because if it was, retrieved information
from activated LTM would flood the DA region. As a consequence,
every new thought would immediately experience massive interference
from many related old thoughts that it reminds us of. In fact, proactive
interference is minimal in short-term memory or WM tasks (Davelaar,
Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher, 2005; Halford,
Maybery, & Bain, 1988; Oberauer & Vockenberg, 2009; Wickens, Born,
& Allen, 1963). The WM system must have a mechanism that controls
retrieval from LTM into the DA region to avoid proactive interference
from LTM.
One solution, of course, is to shield the DA region against LTM by
default, and open the gate for retrieval only on demand (i.e., triggered by a
goal to retrieve long-term knowledge). This solution, however, would most
of the time cut off ongoing cognitive processes from virtually all potentially
relevant background knowledge. As a result, our mind would operate like a
conventional computer that operates on a small set of representations in its
current ‘‘work space,’’ and is equipped with an entirely passive knowledge
base, the contents of which must be retrieved by active search. Such a system
encounters what has become known as the ‘‘frame problem’’ (Pylyshyn,
1987), that is, the problem of how to find, within reasonable time, the
relevant information for the problem at hand in a vast data base.
Therefore, I think a more promising solution is to keep the gate between
the DA region and LTM open by default, so that activated contents of LTM
always have a chance to be retrieved and thereby to influence ongoing
processing. Continuous interaction between the contents of the DA region
and LTM does not, of course, in itself solve the frame problem; rather, it is
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an architectural feature that arguably provides a better basis for a solution
(cf. Shanahan & Baars, 2005): The contents of the DA region continually
activate representations in LTM that match them or are otherwise associated
with them, and activated representations in LTM continuously compete for
being retrieved into the DA region. Thus, in most cases, the associative
network of LTM takes part in the information processing loop to some
degree, as I will elaborate in Section 4.
This assumption means that retrieval from LTM is ‘‘automatic’’ in the
sense that it can occur without being intended. It is not clear yet whether
retrieval is also ‘‘automatic’’ in the sense of not competing with other
processes. Tasks testing retrieval from LTM have been found to compete
with other concurrent cognitive operations in dual-task studies (Carrier &
Pashler, 1995; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996).
In these studies, however, the retrieval task always involved an overt
response reporting the retrieved information (e.g., saying aloud the word
associated to a given cue, or making an old-new decision by pressing one of
two keys in a recognition test). Therefore, it is difficult to tell from the
existing evidence whether the locus of dual-task interference was the
process of retrieving information from LTM into (declarative) WM, or
the selection of a response to report that information. Because I assume
that the response focus can hold only one response representation at a time,
I would predict competition between overt retrieval and other concurrent
tasks at response selection. This assumption could also explain why in dual-
task studies of retrieval it is the secondary task that suffers, whereas retrieval
is protected (Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Perretta, & Toney, 2000). This
would be expected if retrieval itself is not impaired by the secondary task
at all, only its report disrupts or postpones the concurrent secondary task.6
Returning to the problem of controlling retrieval from LTM, a flexible
solution is to put a threshold on the level of activation any LTM represen-
tation must attain to be retrieved into the DA region. That threshold could
be adapted to the present processing goal—by lowering the threshold, the
system could call for relevant knowledge in LTM, and by raising the
threshold, it could ask not to be disturbed by intrusions from LTM.
Adjusting this threshold to task demands must be regarded as one of the
key executive functions regulating WM processes. In Section 4, I will
discuss its role in striking the balance between an analytic and an associative
mode of information processing.
6 Carrier and Pashler (1995), using a variant of the PRP paradigm, argued that their findings cannot be
explained by interference merely at the response selection stage because they found an additive effect of
retrieval difficulty with their manipulation of stimulus–response asynchrony. I do not find this argument
convincing, because it depends on the assumption that retrieval and response selection are distinct processing
stages, and the difficulty of retrieval has no effect on the duration of response selection. I find it more plausible
that their manipulation of retrieval difficulty affected the strength of the retrieved information, which
translates into the rate at which evidence accumulates during response selection (Ratcliff, 1978).
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4. Analytic and Associative
Information Processing
The architecture of WM as outlined so far affords the implementation
of two different modes of information processing. The central components
of declarative WM—that is, the region of direct access and the focus of
attention—together with the central components of procedural WM—that
is, the bridge and the response focus—constitute what I call an analytic
processing subsystem. It is complemented by an associative subsystem that con-
sists of the activated part of LTM, including both declarative and procedural
representations, which are not as strictly separated in (activated) LTM as
they are in the central components of WM.
The distinction between analytic and associative kinds of processes has been
noticed anddiscussedby several authors in thepsychologyof reasoning (Evans&
Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich &West, 2000). Many of these theorists
promote the distinction from one between processes to one between systems.
The two systems go by various names, but the most common ones today are
System1 andSystem2.System1 is characterized as associative, intuitive, heuristic,
fast, and automatic. System 2 is thought of as analytic, deliberative, effortful,
slow, controlled, and dependent on limited resources ofWM (see Evans, 2008,
for a review). I prefer to speak of analytic and associative processing modes,
because I see them as the end points of a continuum, and they arise not from
separate self-contained systems but from interacting sub-systems of WM.
The difference between the two processes or systems has been described
by lists of contrasting features that are only loosely conceptually related. Here
I make a more principled proposal based on the theory of WM outlined
above. The analytic processing mode is characterized by three key features
that distinguish it from the associative mode. First, it relies primarily—in the
extreme case, exclusively—on declarative representations in the DA region,
and procedural representations in the bridge, excluding influences from
activated LTM. Second, it operates on representations with low dimension-
ality. Third, it enables independent selection and manipulation of declarative
and procedural representations. I will elaborate on these three features below.
4.1. Shielding Central Working Memory Against
Long-Term Memory
In the analytic mode, the central components of WM are shielded against
the more peripheral component, that is, the activated part of LTM. This can
be achieved by raising the threshold for retrieval from LTM, and by
establishing strong bindings in the DA region and the bridge that cannot
easily be replaced by activated LTM representations. On the declarative
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side, these control measures ensure that processing draws only on a confined
set of information held in the DA region. For instance, for a deductive
inference, the reasoner should draw only on the information given in the
premises, and refrain from taking his or her beliefs about the subject matter
of the argument into account. People have difficulties narrowing their
reasoning processes in this way—when asked whether a conclusion follows
with logical validity from given premises, their judgments are strongly
influenced by whether or not the conclusion matches their beliefs
(for review see Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000), and whether or not a
counterexample to the conclusion is available in their knowledge base (De
Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2003; Markovits & Quinn, 2002). The
degree to which deductive reasoning is shielded from knowledge in LTM is
a function of intention and ability: The influence of knowledge can be
reduced, but not completely eliminated, by strengthening the instruction to
reason deductively (Vadeboncoeur & Markovits, 1999). Moreover, people
with higher WM capacity are more successful in suppressing the influence
of knowledge in cases where it conflicts with the logically correct answer
(De Neys, 2006). These findings confirm the assumption that retrieval of
knowledge associated with the current contents of the DA region is the
default mode of processing, which needs to be actively prevented when the
task demands exclusive reliance on a confined set of information repre-
sented in the DA region. Nevertheless, people can to some degree decouple
their thinking from their factual knowledge to engage in counterfactual or
hypothetical reasoning. Setting a high threshold for retrieval from LTM
enables us to use the DA region as a blackboard for building new structural
representations without suffering debilitating interference from potentially
conflicting long-term memories or knowledge.
Similarly, on the procedural side, the analytic processing mode means
that the selection of actions in response to perceived stimuli or to WM
contents is determined by the task set in the bridge alone, which implements
potentially arbitrary stimulus–response mappings, and suffers little or no bias
from stimulus–response associations in LTM. Moreover, strong competing
procedural representations in LTM cannot easily take over the bridge and
wrest control from the currently implemented task set. Again, the degree to
which processing is analytic can be controlled in response to task demands
and characteristics of the environments. For instance, in the Stroop task,
people can adjust the relative influence of two competing procedures, one
supported by a strong LTM association (word reading) and one implement-
ing the instructed task (color naming) in the bridge. When the proportion
of incongruent trials is low, people allow a stronger contribution from word
reading, compared to when the proportion of incongruent trials is high
(Kane & Engle, 2003). As in the case of deductive reasoning, the degree to
which processing is shielded from LTM influences depends not only on the
executive processes that adjust the retrieval threshold according to
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intentions and task demands, but also on the ability of the person to
implement strong stimulus–response bindings in the bridge. For instance,
in conditions with a low proportion of incongruent trials, people with low
measuredWM capacity suffered larger Stroop interference effects than those
with high WM capacity (Kane & Engle, 2003).
4.2. Dimensionality of Representations
The assumption that analytic processing relies on representations with low
dimensionality follows from my characterization of the DA region as
providing a mental space in which representations of objects and events
can be bound to positions. The dimensions of this mental space can be used
to represent relations on any dimension, including physical space, time, and
a host of feature dimensions, but the mental space is likely to have a limited
number of dimensions—probably not more than two or three. Thus, the
relations between elements in the DA region will be limited to a small
number of dimensions. For instance, when the relative population sizes of
China, Russia, and India are represented by placing the three countries on
different points along a dimension of mental space, this representation
selectively highlights one feature dimension, population size, while occlud-
ing all other features that we know these countries to have.
This contrasts with the representations of concepts, objects, and events
in LTM, which can be characterized as points in a high-dimensional space
( Jones &Mewhort, 2007; Landauer & Dumais, 1997), reflecting a wealth of
knowledge by which we can distinguish them from each other. The
dimensions of this ‘‘hyperspace’’ typically do not correspond to nameable
feature dimensions. Projecting concepts, objects, or events into the region
of direct access creates a low-dimensional representation in which a small
subset of dimensions becomes explicitly represented by the dimensions of
the mental coordinate system. Operating on representations in the DA
region therefore implies focusing on a small number of feature dimensions,
ignoring all other features of the represented entities. In contrast, processes
that involve LTM representations directly draw on all feature knowledge
linked to those representations in an unselective way.
The difference in dimensionality of representations entering analytic and
associative processes is most evident in comparisons. Perceived stimuli, as
well as representations held in the focus of attention, can be compared with
representations in LTM directly, without having to retrieve the latter into
the more central components of WM. Such a direct comparison or match-
ing process is necessary for an efficient categorical identification of per-
ceived objects and events: Everything we perceive is compared
automatically to all representations in LTM, thus activating matching con-
cepts as well as matching episodic representations. The same automatic
comparison with LTM representations is also responsible for the generation
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of the familiarity signal discussed above in the context of recognition. This
comparison returns a global similarity or match value that sums across all
feature dimensions for which values are available for both the perceived
stimulus and the LTM representation it is compared to. The relative weight
of each dimension can be modulated by cumulative learning but not by ad
hoc task demands or intentions. Thus, the outcome of a comparison in
purely associative processing mode is a global similarity value based on a
weighted average across all available feature dimensions.
In analytic processing mode, in contrast, comparisons use representa-
tions of the entities to be compared in the DA region. Entities bound to
places in mental space are compared by assessing their distance separately for
each dimension; how these distance values are used is determined by the
current task set. Thus, in the analytic mode, entities can be compared with
regard to specific feature dimensions, ignoring all other dimensions, and a
small number of dimensional distances can be assessed separately and com-
bined in any arbitrary way. For instance, we can compare Russia and India
simultaneously on two dimensions, size of population and geographical size,
and judge that India has a larger population but Russia has a larger land area.
We can also integrate both sizes by a weighted-average rule to judge which
country is ‘‘larger.’’ Alternatively, we might compute a ratio of the two
values to judge which country is more densely populated.
A special case of comparison is comparing relations. For instance, we can
compare the relationship between mother and daughter to that between
grandmother and mother, or compare the relationship between the planets
and the sun to the relationship between the electrons and the nucleus in the
atom. Such relational comparisons underlie the relational mapping step in
analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1989). Relational comparisons require access
to individual relations on separable dimensions, rather than a global judg-
ment of similarity or associatedness. These relations must be made explicit
by projecting them into the region of direct access—for instance, the
relation between planets and sun can be represented as a mental model in
space in which smaller objects revolve around a larger central object
(Gentner & Stevens, 1983). Thus, whereas the first step in analogical
reasoning, finding an analogue, involves retrieval from LTM, the second
step, relational mapping, relies exclusively on the region of direct access
and thus constitutes a prime example of analytical processing. Therefore,
analogical-mapping tasks, in which participants fill in a missing piece in a
given analogy (of the form: A::B¼C::?), can be regarded as relatively pure
measures of the capacity of the DA region. Tasks of this kind are found in
many tests of fluid intelligence. The Raven matrices, one of the best single
measures of fluid intelligence (Marshalek, Lohman, & Snow, 1983), can be
understood as analogical-mapping tasks with three times three elements (A::
B::C¼D::E::F¼G::H::?). Fluid intelligence, in turn, is closely related to
measures of WM capacity (Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005; Oberauer,
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Schulze, Wilhelm, & Su¨ß, 2005). Together these facts support my assump-
tion that measures of WM capacity essentially reflect the capacity of the DA
region, which puts a limit on the complexity of structural representations
that can be used in analytical reasoning.
The two modes of comparison—associative and analytical—map onto
two corresponding modes of categorizing entities. Research on category
learning has revealed two kinds of categorization tasks that are best solved by
two distinct processing modes (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Kloos & Sloutsky,
2008). Some categories are distinguished from each other by a single feature
or a logical combination of very few features, and all other features of the
entities to be categorized are irrelevant, and can vary widely within a
category. Scientists and lawyers often strive to define concepts in this
way—for instance, iron is defined by the number of protons and neutrons
in its atoms, regardless of whether it appears in the shape of a nail or the hull of
a ship. These categories are called rule based (Ashby &Maddox, 2005) because
they can be described by relatively simple rules. Other categories are distin-
guished from each other on a large number of feature dimensions that
combine in potentially complex, nonlinear ways (although linear combina-
tions are easiest to learn, see Ashby & Maddox, 2005). The distinguishing
features are often highly redundant, so that a random subset of them
is sufficient for making highly accurate categorization decisions. These cate-
gories are called information–integration categories because categorization
judgments are based on integrating feature information across many dimen-
sions. Explicit categorization rules, if they can be formulated at all, are very
complex because they must mention many features.
Kloos and Sloutsky (2008) capture essentially the same difference by
their concept of category density: With dense categories, a large proportion of
the features of exemplars are relevant for distinguishing members from
nonmembers of the category, and the feature information is highly redun-
dant, whereas with sparse categories, only one or a small subset of features is
relevant, and all other features are uncorrelated with category membership.
Therefore, learning of sparse categories is more dependent on selective
attention to the relevant features. Kloos and Sloutsky show that sparse
categories are best learned when the categorization rule is explicitly given,
whereas dense categories are best learned when exemplars are presented.
When given both kinds of information, adults learned rule-based represen-
tations of sparse categories, but similarity-based representations of dense
categories. Children learned similarity-based representations for both kinds
of categories, suggesting that forming similarity-based representations is the
cognitively less demanding default approach to category learning. DeCaro,
Thomas, and Beilock (2008) found that people with high WM capacity
outperformed those with low capacity on learning low-dimensional rule-
based categories, but performed worse than the low-capacity participants
on learning higher dimensional information–integration categories.
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Love (2002) provided evidence that higher dimensional categories, which
are more difficult to learn than low-dimensional rule-based categories in a
supervised learning regime, can be easier to learn in an unsupervised
incidental learning regime.
Together these results support the distinction between two ways of
learning categories, and two corresponding kinds of category representa-
tions. Dense categories can be represented as clusters in a high-dimensional
feature space as provided by LTM. Their learning requires no selective
attention to specific features, and new exemplars can be categorized on
the basis of overall similarity (i.e., proximity to a cluster in the high-
dimensional space). Sparse, rule-based categories can be represented as
partitions in a low-dimensional mental space that includes only the relevant
feature dimensions; the DA region provides a blackboard for defining that
mental space. Exemplars are categorized by projecting their representations
into that space, thus focusing exclusively on the relevant features. Learning
of dense categories can occur incidentally, because all that is needed is the
accumulation of exemplar memories in the high-dimensional feature space.
Learning of sparse categories must rely on hypothesized (or given) rules that
specify the relevant feature dimensions and the classification rule, and it
requires engagement of the DA region of WM to represent the classification
rule as a boundary in the space that is defined by the relevant feature
dimensions. Therefore, learning of sparse, rule-based categories, but not
of dense information-integration categories, depends on WM capacity.
4.3. Independent Selection of Declarative and
Procedural Representations
I have argued above for separate sub-systems of declarative and procedural
WM because I believe that this separation is an important feature for the
functionality of the system. The separation preserves a high degree of
independence between representations of objects and events on the one
hand, and (cognitive) actions on the other hand.
Here I differentiate this claim, arguing that independence of declarative
and procedural knowledge is a characteristic of the analytic subsystem. The
DA region and the bridge are separate components, the contents of which
are selected independently, and so are the focus of attention for declarative
representations and the response focus for procedural representations.
In activated LTM, however, I assume that declarative and procedural
representations are more closely interwoven. Much evidence has been
gathered showing that whenever a response is given to a stimulus, an
association is built between the stimulus, the response, and the outcome,
such that on the next occurrence of the same stimulus, the associated
response and its outcome are primed (e.g., Hommel, 1998a;
Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005). Learning such associations
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is functional because it enables the cognitive system to acquire the probabi-
listic contingencies between stimuli (or, more generally, situations),
responses, and outcomes. A large part of our everyday actions are routines
executed in common environments—we encounter the same or very
similar situations again and again, and usually respond to them in the same
way as many times before, expecting and typically obtaining the same
outcomes. Being able to rely on learned associations between situations,
actions, and outcomes in such cases bypasses the need to make new deci-
sions at every juncture. At the same time, the system must avoid being
enslaved by learned routines. Even after we have driven the same way from
home to work thousands of times, we want to be able to deviate from the
common route toward a new destination. Thus, the system must have the
choice between following the learned routine and responding to a situation
in a new way. This is essentially the choice between the associative and the
analytic processing mode.
In the associative mode, the perceived stimulus or situation activates a
matching representation in declarative LTM. This declarative representa-
tion is associated to one or several responses to various degrees, based on
previous experience, and these responses are therefore activated accord-
ingly. In associative mode, the threshold for retrieval from LTM into the
bridge is lowered, and there is no strong competing stimulus–response
binding in the bridge. Therefore, the response most highly activated
through LTM associations is retrieved and selected by the response focus.
In analytic mode, in contrast, the retrieval threshold is set high, shielding the
bridge from the habits and routines in procedural LTM, and the desired task
set is implemented by strong stimulus–response bindings in the bridge. The
perceived stimulus or situation still activates a matching representation in
declarative LTM, which activates responses that are associated to that
representation, but the activation of responses in LTM has only a relatively
minor priming effect. Response selection is controlled by the task set in the
bridge, and this task set is selected on the basis of the currently dominant
goal, independent of the stimulus.
To summarize, the present theory takes on many ideas from dual-
process or dual-system theories of reasoning (e.g., Evans, 2003; Sloman,
1996) and of action selection (e.g., Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990)
and integrates them in a common framework. I think of the two modes of
processing not as outcomes of two separate, independent systems of infor-
mation processing, but as the endpoints of a continuum. This continuum
reflects the relative weight of the analytic subsystem of WM (i.e., the region
of direct access and the bridge, together with the focus of attention and the
response focus) and the associative subsystem (i.e., activated LTM repre-
sentations and their associations). The place on this continuum is regulated
by two parameters, the threshold for retrieval from activated LTM, and the
strength of bindings in the central components of WM. The retrieval
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threshold is set on a moment-to-moment basis by executive processes, and
research on cognitive control is beginning to identify a number of variables
that influence these executive processes, among them the amount of con-
flict between responses selected by the implemented task set and responses
primed by associations (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001),
and the amount of performance pressure (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007). The
second parameter, strength of bindings, is not under the control of execu-
tive processes but rather reflects the ability of the system to establish and
maintain bindings and to minimize interference between them. This param-
eter therefore reflects a relatively stable characteristic of an individual’s WM
system, and it is the main source of individual differences in WM capacity
and performance on tasks requiring analytical processing.
5. Concluding Remarks
Readers will have noticed that the ‘‘working memory’’ sketched here
is not genuinely a memory. Rather, it is an attentional system that interacts
equally with perception and with (long-term) memory. This can be illu-
strated with an example investigated by Halford and his colleagues, the
comprehension of statistical interactions (Halford, Baker, McCredden, &
Bain, 2004). The necessary information can be fully available for perception
(e.g., in the form of a table or a bar chart) and yet people have severe
difficulties grasping a three-way interaction and generally fail with a four-
way interaction. A similar argument can be made with respect to many
intelligence test tasks used to measure reasoning ability (Oberauer, Su¨ß,
Wilhelm, &Wittmann, 2003). The limiting factor for complex reasoning is
not our ability to remember all the relevant pieces of information but to put
them together by binding them into a common schema or a common
cognitive coordinate system. This capacity for relational integration
(Robin & Holyoak, 1995) applies equally to representations from memory
and to representation of the perceived environment. My colleagues and
I have developed tasks that measure WM capacity by testing people’s ability
to integrate given information into structures. The given information was
either continually visible or had to be maintained in memory. Both task
versions were highly correlated and were equally good predictors of
reasoning ability (Oberauer, Su¨ß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2008).
WM has not evolved to serve us as a short-term store. The fact that it can
also be used as such is better understood as a by-product of its ability to
uphold a structural representation and shield it to some degree from
unwanted, potentially interfering input from both perception and LTM.
The main function of WM is to serve as a blackboard for information
processing on which we can construct new representations with little
92 Klaus Oberauer
Author's personal copy
interference from old memories, knowledge, and perceptual input, thus
enabling us to investigate a hypothetical alternative state of reality, a future
state—or some aspect of the past.
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